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Remote Vendor Cigarette Sales, Tribal Sovereignty,
and the Jenkins Act: Can I Get a Remedy?
Jonathan L Sirois*
Nearly $900 million in revenue went up in smoke [in
2002] because [New York State] didn't collect taxes
on sales made over the Internet [by] Indian[s].1
[T]his Court [has] held that Indian retailers on an
Indian reservation may be required to collect all
state taxes applicable to [cigarette] sales to non-
Indians. We determined that requiring the tribal
seller to collect these taxes was a minimal burden
justified by the State's interest in assuring the pay-
ment of these concededly lawful taxes .... Although
Congress has . . . never authorized [states] to enforce
[such] tax assessments.2
Can I have some remedy?3
I. INTRODUCTION
Declining state revenues nationwide have led many states to at-
tempt to replenish their thinning coffers through the escalation of
excise taxes4 on the sale of cigarettes.5 However, these revenue-
* B.S. Northeastern University, 1999; J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut
School of Law, 2004. The author would like to thank Bethany Ruth Berger for her insight-
ful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Joe Mahoney, Net, Indian Tribes Butt Into Taxes, DAILY NEWS (NY), Jan. 15, 2003,
at 23.
2. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510, 512
(1991).
3. THE BLACK CROWES, Remedy, on THE SOUTHERN HARMONY AND MUSICAL
COMPANION (Sony Music 1992).
4. An "excise" tax is '[a] tax imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods (such as
a cigarette tax)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (7th ed. 1999). The cigarette tax is actually
a stamp tax that is levied on either the wholesaler or retailer exclusive of applicable state
sales taxes. RONALD JOHN HY & WILLIAM L. WAUGH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICIES:
A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK 124 (1995) [hereinafter WAUGH]. Thus the excise tax repre-
sents a revenue source separate from traditional sales taxes.
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raising efforts have been stymied by the increased marketing and
sale of tax-free cigarettes over the Internet by merchants operat-
ing from federally recognized tribal lands.6 Although it is legal for
5. See, e.g., John M.R. Bull, State Gets Tough on Cigarette Tax: Threatens Smokers
Dodging $1 Charge, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 30, 2002, at B-3 (indicating that
Pennsylvania's "[r]aising [of] the cigarette tax... brought the state enough money to bal-
ance [the] budget . . . and offset a $1.1 billion shortfall" and that "[tihe tax is expected to
raise an additional $600 million for the state government this year"); Joe Follick, McBride
For Cigarette Tax, TAMPA TRIBUNE, July 6, 2002, at 7 (commenting on former Democratic
gubernatorial candidate Bill McBride's proposal to raise the Florida cigarette tax by 50
cents, which would potentially generate $565 million to meet education spending needs);
Debbie Gebolys, Cigarette-Tax Hike Bad For Economy, Opponents Warn; Thriving Black
Market Predicted, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 21, 2002, at 1A (discussing the impact of Ohio
Governor Bob Taft's proposal to "raise excise taxes on cigarettes . . . to help balance the
state budget"); Carlos Guerra, Proposed Cigarette Tax Would Have Another Effect, Too, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 6, 2002, at 1B (discussing a proposal to raise the Texas
cigarette tax by $1 to help meet state revenue needs); Laura Mansnerus, Smokers Gasp,
Not Just From Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at B5 (indicating that "[o]ne state
after another is raising cigarette taxes in [a] year of gaping budget deficits"); Ed Mendel,
Assembly Democrats Target Cigarettes in Tax Package, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 7,
2002, at A-5 (commenting on a proposal to raise the California cigarette tax by $2.13 in
order to meet state revenue needs); Jordan Rau, Borrowing a Page - And Much More; Al-
bany's Deal to Close Budget Gap Relies On Millions In New Debt, Casino Profits, NEWSDAY
(NY), May 3, 2002, at A3 (discussing in part the state assembly's effort to partially close a
billion dollar budget gap by increasing the state cigarette tax); Jay Rey, Steep Cost Of A
Smoke; As States Feel The Pinch of Recession, Governments Are Looking to Higher Cigarette
Taxes As A "Popular" Way To Boost Revenue. As Of April 3, New York's $1.50 Per Pack Will
Be The Nation's Highest, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 26, 2002, at Al (noting that "[a] sluggish
U.S. economy has legislatures in half the states considering raising cigarette taxes for more
revenue this year").
6. Hope Reeves, Read Their Lips: No Taxes (Period.); Smokers Flocking to Reserva-
tions to Buy Cigarettes, Cheap, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at Bi. See also Jay Hancock,
Getting Around The High Cost of Cigarettes Is Much Easier, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 21, 2002,
at 1C (discussing the boost in sales Indian cigarette merchants have experienced in the
wake of cigarette tax increases in New York State); Andrew Herrmann, Tax Hikes Send
Smokers to the Net, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 18, 2002, at 8 (citing the increasing prevalence of
online cigarette sales from shops located on Indian reservations and the potential revenue
losses for the State of Illinois as the result of Internet cigarette sales); Harlan Spector,
Smoking Out Bargains; Shoppers Are Catching a Tax Break Buying Cigarettes Online,
PLAIN DEALER (OH), July 21, 2002, at Al (indicating that the tax-free purchase of ciga-
rettes online has resulted in an increase in tobacco sales outlets on the Internet).
The term "Indian" will be used in place of "Native American" for the duration of this
Article. This reflects the traditional historical identification of indigenous American peo-
ples and the identification of such persons by courts and Congress with respect to the scope
of federal legislation.
[W]e may find some practical value in a definition of "Indian" as a person ... that
some of his ancestors lived in America before its discovery by the white race.
The function of a definition of "Indian" is to establish a test whereby it may be de-
termined whether a given individual is to be excluded from the scope of legislation
dealing with Indians.
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2 (reprint 1986) (1942) [hereinafter
COHEN].
[Tihe term "Indian country"... means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
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Indian and non-Indian7 retailers to sell cigarettes absent a state-
imposed excise tax through interstate commerce, the federal Jen-
kins Act8 ("Jenkins Act" or "Act") mandates periodic reporting to
the applicable state tax administrator to ensure that the excise
tax will be collected from the buyer.9 The Jenkins Act serves the
dual purpose of preventing the consumer from evading state and
locally-imposed cigarette excise taxes, and it prevents interstate
cigarette merchants from gaining a competitive advantage over in-
state retailers. Since the relevant tax jurisdiction will directly
assess the consumer for the taxes owed on their purchase, there is
little incentive for someone to mail order or purchase cigarettes
online when they will incur the same costs. Indeed, it is likely a
higher cost would be realized when shipping and handling are
taken into account than if the individual were to purchase the
cigarettes in-person from a local brick-and-mortar retailer.
Indian vendors, on the other hand, are permitted to market
cigarettes on a tax-free basis to tribal members.' ° This is because
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reserva-
tion, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles
to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2001).
"Although the term 'Indian country' has been used in many senses, it may perhaps
be most usefully defined as country within which Indian laws and customs and federal laws
relating to Indians are generally applicable." COHEN, at 6. For the duration of this Article,
the phrase "tribal lands" will predominantly be used to describe the territories within
which remote Indian cigarette vendors are located.
7. A "non-Indian" is an individual who is not an enrolled member of an Indian tribe.
See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161
(1979). For the purposes of state taxation statutes, residence on an Indian reservation does
not qualify a person as being an Indian. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-378 (2000).
9. See id. The Jenkins Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who sells or transfers for profit cigarettes in interstate commerce,
whereby such cigarettes are shipped into a state taxing the sale or use of cigarettes,
to other than a distributor, or who advertises or offers cigarettes for such a sale or
transfer, shall:
(1) first file with the tobacco tax administrator of the State into which such shipment
is made or in which such advertisement or offer is disseminated...
(2) not later than the 10th day of each calendar month, file with the tobacco tax ad-
ministrator of the State ... a memorandum or copy of the invoice covering each and
every shipment of cigarettes made during the previous calendar month into such
State; the memorandum or invoice in each case to include the name and address of
the person to whom the shipment was made, the brand, and the quantity thereof.
§ 376(a).
10. Colville, 447 U.S. at 160.
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federally recognized Indian tribes," and their enrolled members, 2
enjoy immunity from most forms of state regulation, as well as
taxation statutes. 3 Recently though, the sovereignty enjoyed by
Indians has been used to vitiate the letter of the Jenkins Act in
that cigarette merchants operating from tribal lands have aggres-
sively marketed tax-free cigarettes to non-Indian consumers via
the Internet, while at the same time refusing to adhere to the re-
porting requirements of the Act. 4 This complicity by Indian ciga-
rette vendors in tax evasion has precluded state administrators
from identifying persons who owe excise taxes on cigarette pur-
chases. Left unchecked, this forbearance will translate into reve-
nue deprivation to the states of potentially billions of dollars in
forthcoming years."
11. The Department of the Interior has set forth certain criteria that tribes must sat-
isfy in order to be considered an Indian tribe for the purposes of receiving services by the
federal government. 25 C.F.R. Part 83 (2001) states in pertinent part: ... Federal recogni-
tion may also arise from "treaty, statute, executive or administrative order, or from ...
dealing with the tribe as a political entity." Id. Failure to attain federal recognition may
prevent a state from invoking the protection of tribal sovereignty or sovereign immunity.
Early on the Supreme Court affirmed that the sovereign status of federally recog-
nized Indian tribes immunized them from state taxation. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1866). In The Kansas Indians, the Court stated:
If the tribal organization of the Shawnees is preserved intact and recognized by the
political department of the government as existing, then they are a "people distinct
from others," capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas,
and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union. If under the control
of Congress, from necessity there can be no divided authority .... It may be, that
they cannot exist much longer as a distinct people in the presence of the civilization
of Kansas, "but until they are clothed with the rights and bound to all the duties of
citizens," they enjoy the total immunity from State taxation.
Id. at 755-56.
12. An enrolled Indian is recognized by a particular tribe in accordance with certain
blood requirements that may vary amongst tribes. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL, Second Edition 8 (1988) [hereinafter CANBY].
13. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1972). The Court
stated:
State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation ex-
cept where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply. It follows
that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to State
taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act of Con-
gress.
Id. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 845 (1958)).
14. Karen Setze, Smuggling, Internet Sales Threaten States' Cigarette Tax Revenue,
STATE TAX TODAY, Sept. 11, 2002, at 711-1 (indicating that "many who purport to be Indian
sellers.., say they are not bound by the Jenkins Act... [niow the tax issue is tangled with
considerations of tribal sovereignty").
15. Cigarette sales from Indian reservations primarily occur in two different ways, via
Internet "smokeshops" operated by tribal vendors, and through on-reservation sales at
traditional brick-and-mortar establishments. It has been estimated that Internet sales of
cigarettes, originating primarily from Indian reservations, comprise three percent of the
national market. This figure has been projected to reach fourteen percent by 2005.
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The enforcement mechanism of the Jenkins Act is codified at 15
U.S.C. § 377 ("§ 377"), which provides that persons found to be in
violation of the reporting requirements "shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than 6 months, or both." 6 Enforcement authority for
this provision resides with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"),
while the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") retains primary
investigative responsibility. 7 In 1949, when the Jenkins Act was
passed, the logical choice for uniform enforcement of the law was
the DOJ in conjunction with the FBI. At the time of enactment,
there may have existed ample resources to identify and enjoin
possible offenders. However, in the contemporary socio-political
climate, the DOJ has reserved the bulk of its resources to counter
the burgeoning threat of domestic terrorism, and the FBI has
closely followed suit.'8 As this Article will demonstrate, there ex-
ists scant means, not to mention very little incentive, for the fed-
eral government to pursue misdemeanor offenses on behalf of
state revenue departments. Moreover, the Internet and its poten-
Herrmann, supra note 6. In Fiscal Year 2001, cigarette pack sales were estimated at 20.7
billion. Eric Lindblom, State Cigarette Tax Rates & Rank, Date of Last Increase and Re-
lated Data, (Oct. 10, 2002), available at
http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0099.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
During the same period, the average national cigarette tax per pack was 60 cents. Id.
Assuming the tax rate and annual pack consumption remain static for the three calendar
years 2003-05, and purchases via the Internet increase four percent annually during the
same period, culminating with fourteen percent in the final year, the approximate tax
revenue loss nationwide from 2002-05 will be $400,000,000 from online purchases alone. A
more liberal estimate of the projected revenue losses (includes sales and use taxes as well
as excise taxes) to states from tobacco (all tobacco products, including cigars and smokeless
tobacco) sales in 2005 alone will be $1.4 billion. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET
CIGARETTE SALES: GIVING ATF INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY MAY IMPROVE REPORTING AND
ENHANCEMENT 1 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] available at
http:J/www.gao.gov/news.items/do2743.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2002). Although this figure
includes the tax revenue lost from all tobacco products sold online and therefore may not be
the most accurate estimate for an Article focusing exclusively on cigarette sales, it should
be noted that cigarette excise taxes comprise the largest percentage of the projected reve-
nue losses to states and thus represents the area of greatest concern for state and federal
officials. See id.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 377.
17. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. It should be noted that the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") maintains ancillary authority to enforce the Jenkins Act
through the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, "which makes it unlawful for any person
to ship, transport, receive, possess, sell, distribute, or purchase more than 60,000 [3,000
packs, or 300 cartons] cigarettes that bear no evidence of state cigarette tax payment in the
state in which the cigarettes are found." Id. at 8. However, because few consumers are
likely to make purchases in excess of 300 cartons, the ATF is not likely to become apprised
of, much less intervene, in the many transactions that occur over the Internet on a regular
basis.
18. Id. at 7.
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tial for commercial exploitation of the statute's shortcomings were
simply not foreseeable when the Jenkins Act was originally en-
acted. 9 Taken together, circumstance has rendered the Jenkins
Act little more than a paper tiger - and a timid one at that. En-
forcement of the Act has been virtually nonexistent," a fact that
has not escaped the notice of cigarette vendors operating from
tribal lands. Indeed, some Indian-operated websites audaciously
enumerate the provisions of the Jenkins Act and then indicate
why it does not apply to them.2 It appears then that wholesale
changes to the Jenkins Act are required to provide for and secure
comprehensive enforcement of the reporting requirements of 15
U.S.C. § 376 ("§ 376"). 22 Essential to such improvements is also
the initial determination that the Jenkins Act can be applied to
remote Indian cigarette vendors.
This Article examines the statutory and jurisprudential issues
pertaining to remote vendor23 sales of cigarettes from tribal lands,
as well as outlining remedial measures intended to ensure the col-
lection of state cigarette excise taxes and leave intact the doctrines
of tribal sovereignty and sovereign immunity.
To place the issue of excise tax fraud in the proper context, Part
II elucidates why states possess such a strong interest in the prob-
lem of remote vendor cigarette sales, and the attendant conse-
quences of pervasive noncompliance with tax reporting and collec-
tion regulations. These questions will be answered through an
account of the myriad revenue, public health, and political justifi-
cations for escalating cigarette taxes.
Part III briefly outlines the history of the Jenkins Act, paying
particular attention to the enforcement mechanisms of the stat-
ute, in addition to the limited historical and contemporary en-
forcement of the Act. As will be shown, technological advances
19. Id. at 6.
20. See id.
21. The main page of the www.senecasmokes.com web site prominently displays notice
to customers that "SenecaSmokes DOES NOT report cigarette or tobacco sales to ANY
state taxation or tobacco department," at http://www.senecasmokes.com (last visited Oct.
31, 2002). The website also provides a link to the text of the Jenkins Act, and states that
"[tihere has been a lot of talk lately about the Jenkins Act... Native Americans are exempt
from the Jenkins Act because we are independent nations under our federal treaties. That
is the reason that we do not pay, or collect, sales taxes," at
http://www.senecasmokes.com/thejenkinsact.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
22. See supra note 9.
23. These are vendors engaging in "remote sales" across state lines, particularly via the
Internet. Charles E. McClure, Jr., Radical Reform of the State Sales and Use Tax: Achiev-
ing Simplicity, Economic Neutrality, and Fairness, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 567, 567 (2000).
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have left the Jenkins Act ill-suited to fulfill its stated objective.
The growth of Internet commerce has spawned a host of implica-
tions for the collection of state tax revenues. For that reason two
issues ancillary to remote vendor cigarette sales, situs and the
Internet Tax Freedom Act, will be addressed. This section then
shifts to summarize the findings of a congressionally-
commissioned report by the General Accounting Office concerning
remote vendor cigarette sales and the Jenkins Act. The recom-
mendations of the report will then be discussed and evaluated.
Part IV, Tribal Sovereignty, chronicles the challenge New York
encountered in its attempts to secure compliance by Indian ciga-
rette retailers with excise tax collection regulations and the resul-
tant decision issued by the United States Supreme Court address-
ing the dispute. Although the state prevailed in the judicial arena
and subsequently undertook various efforts to enforce the collec-
tion of cigarette taxes, the threat of mass protest by various In-
dian tribes ultimately impelled state officials to capitulate and
rescind the tax collection regulations. As the dispute in New York
was dominated by themes of tribal sovereign independence from
state taxation, this section will briefly trace the evolution of the
doctrine of tribal sovereignty in the context of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence. The concluding subsection will focus on the three
primary tests employed by the Court to resolve the validity of
state tax regulations imposed upon Indians.
In view of the preceding historical analysis, Part V, Sovereignty
and Cigarettes will discuss the principal Supreme Court cases re-
lated to the application of state cigarette taxes to reservation
sales. As will be shown, the Court has continually affirmed states'
rights to impose tax collection requirements on Indian retailers
selling cigarettes to non-Indians, yet paradoxically has denied
states the ability to enforce their rights by means of initiating
lawsuits to recover taxes owed. States have accordingly been
given a right to impose excise tax collection requirements without
an effective remedy to ensure compliance by Indian vendors.
However, fears by state tax administrators that they possess a
right without a remedy are misplaced. At their disposal exists the
Jenkins Act, which was enacted precisely for the purpose of aiding
states in the collection of cigarette tax revenues. Complicating the
seemingly straightforward equation though are numerous obsta-
cles that require negotiation, including but not limited to possible
invalidation of the Jenkins Act by other federal statutes or polices,
infringement upon tribal sovereignty, and acute deficiencies in the
Fall 2003
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penalty provision of the Jenkins Act. These challenges serve as
the segue to the main analysis of this Article.
The virtual obsolescence of the Jenkins Act has left the report-
ing and penalty statutes unchallenged by Indian cigarette ven-
dors. As a consequence, there exists no singular decision by any
court that bears directly on the question of whether the Jenkins
Act would be sustained in a challenge by an Indian tribe or mem-
ber on the grounds that it operates in violation of the principles of
Indian sovereignty or sovereign immunity. Part VI will therefore
separately examine the reporting requirements of § 376 in the
framework of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the appli-
cability of state tax reporting guidelines for cigarette sales from
Indians to non-Indians, federal laws of general applicability to
Indian tribes, in addition to the penalty provision of § 377 and the
scope of federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians.
Based upon the conclusions reached in the foregoing analysis,
Part VII, Recommendations will offer remedial measures that will
strengthen enforcement of the Jenkins Act, enable states to collect
cigarette tax revenue owed from Internet purchases, as well as
maintain the fundamental tenets of tribal sovereignty.
II. PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING THE CIGARETTE
EXCISE TAX
Rare is the tax increase that constitutes a win-win proposition
for elected officials; however, in the case of cigarette excise tax
enactments, this is precisely the case. Not only do cigarette tax
increases result in a veritable revenue windfall for many jurisdic-
tions, 4 but also, elected officials will typically receive praise for
their decision to make an increasingly socially unacceptable com-
modity more expensive. Aside from this superficial political bene-
fit cigarette tax increases impart to elected officials, there exists a
number of legitimate social objectives supporting the excise tax.
These include the increasing need for consistent and substantial
sources of revenue for states to help meet general health care ex-
penditures and fund targeted programs to reduce smoking-related
24. See Christopher May, Note, Smoke and Mirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related Medi-
caid Costs May Turn Out To Be a Mirage, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1080 (1997) (discussing
litigation initiated by states to recover from tobacco companies health care costs incurred
as the result of smoking-related illnesses). The term "windfall" has been used because
litigation settlements with tobacco companies and excise tax increases are intended to
compensate the state for essentially the same thing: health care-related expenditures. See
WAUGH, supra note 4, at 124; see also May, at 1080.
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illnesses,25 provide an incentive for current smokers to quit,26 dis-
suade youths from taking up the habit,27 and, underlying all of the
preceding justifications, the changing social mores regarding the
acceptability of cigarette consumption.2 s
A. Revenue Justifications
As alluded to in the foregoing, the enhancement of sumptuary,
or so-called "sin taxes," levied on tobacco and alcohol, 29 are politi-
cally popular and expedient means of raising revenue simply be-
cause there exists no pro-smoking lobby to effectively oppose such
enactments." The cigarette excise tax functions in a counterintui-
tive manner; it is designed to discourage the consumption of to-
bacco, yet also constitute a stable source of revenue for taxing ju-
risdictions." It would seem that from a public health perspective,
the greater the effectiveness of the tax, the less revenue a state is
likely to collect. History, however, has demonstrated the opposite.
25. See, e.g., Jennifer Dorrah, California and the West; California Called Model on
Tobacco, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al (discussing a report that "praised Cali-
fornia ... for using a portion of revenue from its 87-cent excise tax - among the highest in
the nation - to fund tobacco use prevention").
26. See Paul W. Valentine, More Kick the Habit After MD Cigarette Tax Boost; Analysts
Say 20-Cent Rise One Factor in Sharp Decline, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 10, 1994, at M1
(noting that "[t]he number of smokers in Maryland dropped sharply after a 20-cent tax
increase on cigarettes was imposed").
27. Stratford Douglas & Govind Hariharan, The Hazard of Starting Smoking: Esti-
mates From a Split Population Duration Model, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 213 (1994) (discussing
the effectiveness of higher cigarette prices in dissuading youths from taking up smoking).
28. See Special to the New York Times, Tobacco Industry Fights Anti-Smoking Tax
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, § 1, at 21 (commenting that as part of an initiative to pass
a ballot measure in Massachusetts intending to increase the cigarette excise tax by 25
cents, "traditional tobacco foes like the American Cancer Society, medical societies, insur-
ers and hospitals have assembled large coalitions to push for the . . . tax" including 240
organizations, which is the "largest assembled for a ballot initiative in the state's history").
The 1997 multi-billion dollar settlement between states and the nation's cigarette manufac-
turer's further evidences the growing intolerance of tobacco consumption. See, e.g., John
Riley, Tobacco Wars/Smoking Under Seige/Smokers Come Up Losers/Settlement Will Be
Reflected In Cigarette Prices, NEWSDAY (NY), June 20, 1997, at A8 (noting that "[u]nder the
terms of the accord.., smokers will pay ... for antismoking efforts, including up to $500
million a year for a massive anti-tobacco as blitz, that . . . will depict smokers as pathetic,
imprudent and self-destructive" and that the "vast majority of Americans support the idea
of cracking down on the tobacco industry and protecting minors").
29. See, e.g., Jendi B. Reiter, Essay, Citizens or Sinners? - The Economic and Political
Inequity of "Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
443 (1996) (arguing that sin taxes on tobacco and alcohol undermine the democratic ideals
of dignity and free-choice, that such taxes are economically regressive and discriminatory,
and that they are not effective means of reducing the social impact of tobacco and alcohol
use).
30. See id. at 451.
31. WAUGH, supra note 4, at 111.
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Tax increases have relatively little correlation to decreases in
cigarette consumption.32 Thus, the perverse relationship between
social purpose and revenue generation has resulted in the ciga-
rette tax becoming a proportionally larger revenue source for
many states. Indeed, the projected annual excise tax revenue for
states nationwide in fiscal year 2001 alone was $8.2 billion.33 De-
pending upon the taxing jurisdiction, the annual revenue from
cigarette sales in a single state may exceed $1 billion.34
B. Compensatory Health Care Objectives
Cigarette excise taxes are used by many states specifically to
fund health programs.35  Habitual cigarette consumption can re-
sult in a variety of serious health problems, including, but not lim-
ited to, respiratory and cardiopulmonary diseases,36 in addition to
jeopardizing the health of nonsmokers exposed to second-hand
smoke.37 Frequently, the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses
becomes externalized as a responsibility of government and, ulti-
mately, the taxpayer. This is because smokers tend to fall on the
lower end of the socioeconomic scale and often cannot afford
health insurance.38  As such, federal and state governments be-
come responsible for subsidizing the medical needs of the indigent
through such health care services as the Medicaid program.39 An-
32. Id. at 123. The authors note that while cigarette consumption has declined in re-
cent years, it has little correlation with the increase in cigarette taxes, but rather that
people have come to better understand the inherent health risks of smoking. Id. at 124.
But see Rey, supra note 5. Data has shown that "when there's a 10 percent increase in
cigarette prices, there's a related 4 percent drop in cigarette consumption" and that
"[r]aising the price of cigarettes has been shown to be the most powerful tool to reducing
tobacco consumption." Id.
33. Lindblom, supra note 15.
34. In FY 2001, California and New York were projected to collect $1.28 billion and $1
billion, respectively, from cigarette sales. Id.
35. WAUGH, supra note 4, at 124.
36. U.S. DEPT. HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE
SURGEON GENERAL: SMOKING AND HEALTH 5 (1963).
37. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SVCS., PUB. No.
1103, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE 6 (1994) [hereinafter SURGEON
GENERAL].
38. See D.J. Hole & C.R. Gillis, Defeating Lung Cancer - A Social Class Problem?, 18
LUNG CANCER (Supp.) 192, 192 (1997) (finding that there is an "increase in the higher abso-
lute rate of lung cancer [attributable to cigarette consumption] . . . among manual and
economically deprived sections of the population at all levels of smoking"); see also Amanda
J. Lee et al., Cigarette Smoking and Employment Status, 33 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1309, 1309
(1991) (indicating that "the proportion of current smokers.., was found to be considerably
high[] among the unemployed... [and that] smoking habits among the unemployed reflect
a complex interaction of financial and ... social factors").
39. May, supra note 24, at 1067.
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nual health care costs of treating smoking-related illnesses have
been estimated to exceed $50 billion. ° Because smokers are more
likely to contribute to this figure by requiring medical services as
a result of their habits, not only will nonsmokers receive less ser-
vices in relation to taxes paid, but they will also shoulder a greater
percentage of the cost of publicly-financed health care programs."
This is especially true where general tax revenues are dedicated
for such outlays.
As a means of internalizing smoking-related health care expen-
ditures, the excise tax enables a state government to offset their
outlays in a relatively benign way: by shifting the tax burden from
the nonsmokers to the smokers. Some legal scholars have prof-
fered loss-shifting proposals for state health care expenditures
that would be funded entirely through cigarette excise taxes. 2 In
practice, a number of jurisdictions do dedicate a portion of reve-
nues received through the cigarette excise tax to offset ongoing
health-care expenditures and fund tobacco prevention programs."
Massachusetts, for example, has in the past earmarked $15 mil-
lion from excise tax revenues to fund health programs, in addition
to holding referendums for the increase of cigarette taxes to fund
anti-smoking programs.44 California and Ohio have also dedicated
millions of cigarette tax receipts to fund tobacco education pro-
grams. 5 The former state spent in excess of $100 million of the
40. See Richard C. Ausness, Paying for the Health Care Costs of Smoking: Loss Shifting
and Loss Bearing, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 537, 538 (1998) (discussing a variety of loss-shifting
approaches to recover tobacco-related health care expenses, including the adoption of excise
taxes and litigation with tobacco companies).
41. See id. at 538.
42. Id. at 541-43. A number of proposals are outlined in Professor Ausness' article, and
they range from instituting a graduated excise tax based upon the hazardous qualities of a
particular cigarette brand to a tax based upon the number of health-related claims alleged
against a manufacturer. As per the latter proposal, the greater the number of claims filed
against a manufacturer would result in a higher tax being assessed on that manufacturer's
brand(s). Id. at 542-43.
43. See, e.g., Garret Condon, Push Against Tobacco Lagging; State Ranks 45th in Pre-
vention Spending, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 16, 2002, at B1 (commenting that "[r]aising
the excise tax is one of the effective strategies a state can do to reduce the illness and death
that results from tobacco use'" and that Connecticut elected officials are "push[ing] to use..
. money raised from [a] proposed [cigarette excise] tax increase to pay for anti-tobacco pro-
grams"); Dorrah, supra note 25 (noting that nine states devote a significant portion of their
excise tax revenues to tobacco prevention).
44. Teresa M. Hanafin, Weld Wins 1, Loses 1 in Panel's Health Bill, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 12, 1991, at 59; Special to the New York Times, supra note 28.
45. Regina McEnery, Ohioans: Smokers As Well As Sedentary, PLAIN DEALER (OH),
Nov. 3, 2000, at 6B.
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excise taxes received in 1999 on anti-smoking campaigns, and an-
other $25 million on tobacco research. 6
C. Preventative Health Care Objectives
Another rationale for the escalation of cigarette excise taxes is
to make the habit prohibitively expensive so that current smokers
are enticed to quit. The purported correlation between a reduction
in cigarette consumption amongst current smokers and an in-
crease in excise taxes is simply that consumers react unfavorably
to higher product costs. 4 7 While empirical evidence tends to sup-
port the notion that increases in the excise tax are linked to a re-
duction in cigarette purchases in some geographic areas, 8 it does
not discount the likelihood that consumers are simply purchasing
cigarettes from other jurisdictions (e.g., tribal lands), thus render-
ing many consumption studies skewed and inaccurate. Moreover,
advocates of the price/reduction correlation neglect to account for
the addictive quality of cigarettes, nor do they fully counter evi-
dence that demand for cigarettes is comparatively inelastic to up-
ward adjustments in the excise tax. 9 Whatever the merits of the
argument though, reduced cigarette consumption by current
smokers is frequently invoked as a reason for increasing the excise
tax.
50
A more compelling justification for increasing the cigarette ex-
cise tax is that it reduces the incidence of smoking among young
adults and deters potential new smokers from adopting the habit.
This is partially due to the fact that young adults have less dis-
posable income than adults to spend on cigarettes, and are there-
46. Id.
47. David Bourne et al., The Effect of Raising State and Federal Tobacco Taxes, 38 J.
FAM. PRAC. 300, 300 (1994) (advocating excise tax increases as a means to reduce the
prevalence of smoking). See also Gordon Fairclough, Losing Control: Four Biggest Cigarette
Makers Can't Raise Prices as They Did, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2002, at Al (indicating that
"[s]mokers... are responding to sky-high prices by quitting entirely").
48. See Michael Cooper, Cigarette Tax, Highest in the Nation, Cuts Sales by Half, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2002, at B1 (stating that "[o]nly 15,630,000 packs were sold in [New York]
[C]ity during July [2002], the first month of the [$1.50 a pack] tax [increase], which repre-
sents a 47 percent drop from the 29,220,000 packs sold last July").
49. See WAUGH, supra note 4, at 124. See also Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The
Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1255 (1998) (outlining the advantages of a proposed market-based (e.g., enter-
prise liability), government-regulated system of victim compensation for the social harm of
cigarettes).
50. Cooper, supra note 48.
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fore likely to be more sensitive to price increases.5' For long-term
reductions in the incidence of smoking, deterrence can be particu-
larly effective. "[S]tudies have shown that if a smoker begins to
smoke before the age of eighteen, then that individual will proba-
bly remain a smoker for life, but if a smoker begins later in adult-
hood, there is more of a chance that he or she will quit."5 2 One
way to effectuate a reduction in the incidence in teen smoking is
through the enforcement of anti-smoking laws and the creation of
programs to educate teens about the hazards of smoking.53 In or-
der to fund such anti-smoking efforts, the excise tax is the ideal
vehicle. States such as California and New Jersey have sought to
raise revenue through excise tax increases as a means of funding
initiatives to reduce smoking amongst minors.54  Where the
"health of the children" can be invoked to justify excise tax in-
creases, rest assured that voters and politicians alike will seize
the opportunity to do so.55
D. Changing Social Mores
Underlying all of the justifications outlined in the preceding dis-
cussion is the immutable fact that smoking is increasingly per-
ceived as a socially unacceptable habit that imperils the health of
the consumer and those around her. One need not travel any fur-
ther than a local eating establishment to observe the current
treatment of cigarette smokers. If the practice has not been
banned completely, then it likely has been restricted in some
manner. 6 Even beyond commercial restrictions against smoking,
51. Bourne, supra note 47, at 300.
52. Jennifer McCullough, Note, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Industry:
New Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 719 (1997)
(citations omitted).
53. See SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 37, at 8 (finding that "[n]umerous research
studies over the past 15 years suggest that organized interventions can help prevent the
onset of smoking" amongst youths, and that a "crucial element of prevention is access [to
such programs] .... [And that] [a]ctive enforcement of age-at-sale policies . . .appear[]
necessary to prevent minors' access to tobacco").
54. McCullough, supra note 52, at 731.
55. See John E. Petersen, Go Forth and Sin More, Please, GOVERNING, Feb. 1997, at 70
(indicating that "[a]lthough the [Maryland] governor [Parris N. Glendening] had pledged
not raise taxes while in office, he said he felt compelled to make an exception in view of
scientific evidence that increases in this [excise] tax would save the 'lives of sons and
daughters'").
56. See, e.g., Michael Lasalandra, Support for Smoke-Free Eateries Soars in Mass.,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2001, at 5 (indicating that a state Department of Public Health
report "showed that 52 percent of the residents of Massachusetts live in communities that
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numerous communities have banned smoking outright in many
public places.57 In addition, private employers have seen fit to ex-
tend anti-smoking regulations from interior workspaces to their
surrounding properties in an effort to curb the health risks to oth-
ers.
Such restrictions illustrate a trend that essentially admonishes
smokers on the basis of their habit. Tax increases and restrictions
designed to curtail consumption, however, are not rooted in socie-
tal animus toward the smokers themselves, but rather, they stem
from the notion that "society disapproves of their behavior."59 A
mix of perception and reality bolsters such reasoning. The inher-
ent health risks of cigarette smoke to the immediate consumer are
correctly perceived to be hazardous to nonsmokers as well.6 ° If
smokers are going to engage in a habit that imperils the wellbeing
of those around them, then society will, in addition to mitigating
the incidence of indirect harm through communal restrictions, im-
pose a premium for engaging in such an activity. Hence, we find
the derivation of the colloquialism "sin tax." Additionally, the
losses that society at large incurs in subsidizing the medical needs
of smokers also underlie the loss-shifting rationale of the excise
tax.6 It has been estimated that two thirds of American voters
support a $2-per-pack increase in the excise tax, and that such
now ban smoking in restaurants, while another 25 percent live in cities and towns that
have enacted some kind of restrictions").
57. See, e.g., Nancy Lofholm, Town Afire Over Smoking Ban: Montrose Vote Shocks
Opponents; Some Vow Defiance, DENVER POST, Apr. 22, 2001, at B-1 (discussing the effects
of a locally-imposed ordinance that prohibits smoking in all public places, except for private
clubs and a handful of taverns); Eun Lee Koh, Smoking Banned in Public Places Town
Joins Others With Strict Limits, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 2001, at 1 (commenting that
when the "Southborough [Massachusetts] Board of Health voted ... to ban smoking in all
public places, it joined communities throughout the region"); Michael Stetz, Smoking Battle
is Blown Indoors; Foes Set Sights on More Stringent Bans in Public, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 12, 2001, at A-1 (noting that "[alfter years of concerted effort by anti-
smoking forces - and buoyed by strong public support in many cases - it is now illegal in
California to smoke in the workplace, in public buildings, in restaurants, [and] in bars and
taverns").
58. Stephanie Armour, No-Smoking Zones Reach Outside: More Firms Issue Controver-
sial Rules, USA TODAY, July 6, 2001, at 1A (discussing the efforts of private employers
nationwide to regulate outdoor smoking).
59. Reiter, supra note 29, at 443.
60. Matthew Baldini, Note, The Cigarette Battle: Anti-Smoking Proponents Go for the
Knockout, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 348, 355 (1995) (indicating that '[i]n addition to the
established risks that smoking imposes on the smoker .... the EPA has determined that
nonsmokers exposed to . . . [secondhand smoke] are vulnerable to comparable health
risk[s]").
61. Ausness, supra note 40, at 541.
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"[p]ublic support is especially high when tobacco tax funds are
earmarked for health purposes."62
E. Loss Shifting to Cigarette Manufacturers
Finally, the widely held perception that cigarette manufacturers
intentionally market cigarettes to youths and have continually
misrepresented the known health risks of cigarettes63 buttresses
arguments for further regulation and tax increases on cigarettes.
What better way to punish producers than to reduce their cus-
tomer base by making the product more expensive and more diffi-
cult for the buyer to consume? Regardless of the effectiveness of
these tactics, those who profit off of cigarettes have been identified
as "ideal targets"' for the shifting of societal losses and otherwise
"assuming" a portion of their customers' costs."
III. THE JENKINS ACT
Long before the advent of the Internet, cigarette consumers
were faced with essentially two choices in obtaining the commod-
ity: they could either mail order their favorite brands at a discount
from low-taxing jurisdictions, which was often the state of produc-
tion, or simply visit their local retailer and pay the premium price
inclusive of the state and local excise taxes. It was due to the for-
mer method that Congress intervened in 1949 and enacted 15
U.S.C. §§ 375-378 to prevent cigarette consumers from purchasing
the product from interstate merchants absent the eventual appli-
cation of the excise tax imposed by the relevant jurisdictions."
A. Enactment
Introduced by Representative Thomas Albert Jenkins (R-Ohio),
the bill was intended to enlist the resources of the federal govern-
ment to aid states in collecting cigarette excise taxes.67  During
62. Bourne, supra note 47, at 300.
63. PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
COVER-UP, 6-7, 76-77 (1996).
64. Ausness, supra note 40, at 552.
65. Where the excise tax is increased, cigarette manufacturers have often sought to
maintain market share by reducing the wholesale prices of their product. This has the
effect of shifting the cost of the actual product back to the manufacturer while the con-
sumer pays for the increased excise tax. See Fairclough, supra note 47.




floor debate of the legislation in the House of Representatives,
William L. Pfeiffer (R-N.Y.) articulated the dominant purpose of
the Jenkins Act with inflated rhetorical flourish in stating:
When the majority of people are required to conform with our
laws and a minority permitted to ignore them, it cannot help
but weaken our respect for the laws and for the governmental
agencies entrusted with their administration and enforce-
ment. Moreover, because each citizen is expected and should
bear his just burden of taxation - be it Federal, State, or local
- any condition or practice which renders it simple and effort-
less for him to evade such taxation, encourages general viola-
tion of the law and - just as significant - saddles the law-
abiding citizens with a heavier and unwarranted tax burden.68
Even beyond this dominant objective, however, were other
"practical considerations," which, as explicated by Representative
Pfeiffer, included:
[The interests] of hundreds of wholesalers and thousands of
retailers who depend for their livelihood on the sale of ciga-
rettes. The constantly increasing abuse of State cigarette tax
laws deprives these merchants of the sales they are rightfully
entitled to and would have had were it not for the illicit ship-
ment of cigarettes into their State. These deserving busi-
nessmen are penalized merely because they are located in a
State which imposes a cigarette tax.69
At the time the bill was under consideration, the federal gov-
ernment imposed an excise tax on cigarettes of less than 10-cents,
and states, such as Ohio, imposed a tax of 2-cents. ° Of the then
forty-eight states, thirty-nine actually imposed a tax, often not
exceeding 1-cent per pack.7 As the average price of a pack of ciga-
rettes in the 1940s was approximately twenty-three cents,72 the
cost savings for an Ohio resident to mail order one carton of ciga-
rettes from North Carolina, which then did not impose an excise
tax,73 at the average price of $2.30, was 20-cents, or roughly nine-
68. Id. at 6355.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 6351.
71. Id.
72. 95 CONG. REc. 6352.
73. Id.
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percent of the total carton price. Much like the present dynamic
in state taxation, however, several jurisdictions relied much more
heavily on the excise tax and levied up to 8-cents per pack, thus
presenting the opportunity for residents to save up to 80-cents per
carton purchased through the mails,4 a considerable sum given
the average price of a carton. Indeed, the estimated amount of
sales tax lost each year as the result of mail order purchases prior
to the enactment of the Jenkins Act was between $40,000,000 and
$50,000,000.'-
To effectuate the goals of the legislation, the Jenkins Act re-
quires that any person76 selling cigarettes via interstate commerce
to anyone other than a distributor licensed by or located in the
destination state77 absent the excise tax imposed by that jurisdic-
tion must provide the tobacco tax administrator" with a list of
customers and the quantity of cigarettes sold, i.e., invoices of pur-
chase. 9 The tax jurisdictions will then directly assess the con-
74. See id. at 6355. It should also be noted that many municipalities imposed addi-
tional cigarette excise taxes. Id. at 6363.
75. Id. at 6350.
76. 35 U.S.C. § 375 defines "person" to include "corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." 15 U.S.C.
§ 375(1) (2000).
77. Section 375 defines "distributor licensed by or located in such State" to mean "any
person located in such State who distributes cigarettes at wholesale or retail" and is "[au-
thorized] by State statute or regulation [to] distribute[] cigarettes at wholesale or retail."
Id. § 375(3)(A)-(B). The licensing aspect of this subsection is crucial to the success of the
legislation because distributors are required to have all packs stamped prior to sale. As a
result, the statute distinguishes between interstate sales to licensed merchants who are
required to impose the excise tax by state law in order to continue to engage in the sale of
cigarettes, and the typical consumer who would otherwise not be accountable to anyone at
the point of purchase.
Section 375 defines "State" to include "the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii,
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Id. § 375(6). For the duration of this Article, the
terms "jurisdiction" or "tax jurisdiction" will be used in place of "State" where applicable.
This is because many municipalities impose additional excise taxes over those of the state,
and the Jenkins Act also serves to assist in the collection of such supplementary levies.
Section 376(a) specifically imposes reporting requirements if "cigarettes are shipped into a
State taxing the use or sale of cigarettes." Id. § 376(a) (emphasis added). Thus, so long as
the state imposes an excise tax, then presumably the municipality will also be able to re-
cover any uncollected taxes, so long as the state tobacco tax administrator informs the
municipality that a resident of such will be assessed for unpaid excise taxes.
The statute also distinguishes between interstate sales made for profit and gifts.
Section 375(7) mandates reporting only when cigarettes are "transfer[red] for profit . ..
including any transfer or disposition by an agent to his principal in connection with which
the agent receives anything of value." Id. § 375(7).
78. Section 375(5) defines this to mean "the State official duly authorized to administer
the cigarette tax law of a state." Id. § 375(5). This is typically a state commissioner of
revenue or taxation.
79. Id. § 376.
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sumer for the excise taxes owed on the purchases. Any person
found to be in violation of the reporting requirements of the Jen-
kins Act will be found "guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined
not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or
both."0 Enforcement responsibilities fall under the purview of the
DOJ, with the FBI acting as the lead agency for investigating vio-
lations of § 376.1
B. Past Enforcement
Subsequent to the passage of the Jenkins Act, compliance with
the regulations by remote cigarette vendors was, seemingly, near
universal. This is evidenced by the dearth of case law concerning
prosecutions under the penalties provision, and the very few
amendments made to the original Act. 2 The most significant chal-
lenge to the Jenkins Act came in 1950 when the Consumer Mail
Order Association of America, a trade association representing
businesses engaged exclusively in the sale of mail order cigarettes,
brought an action against the United States Attorney General, J.
Howard McGrath, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute on
the grounds that it was unconstitutional. 3 The district court
summarily rejected the abstract constitutional claim on the
grounds that "[u]nless this [reporting] requirement is itself subject
to some constitutional defect such as arbitrariness ... the regula-
tion is a valid exercise of the federal commerce power." 4 The
plaintiffs also attacked the validity of the Jenkins Act on the
grounds that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
80. Id. § 377.
81. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
82. A Westlaw search of the "Jenkins Act" uncovered a mere handful of cases relating
to the Act, and among these, very few actually pertained to violations of the reporting pro-
vision. Similarly, the United States Code Service ("USCS") indicates very few challenges to
the Act itself. See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 375-378 (2000). See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 516
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that the Jenkins Act was not violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment even though it regulates cigarettes but not the sale of little
cigars). The Jenkins Act has also been amended on very few occasions since 1949. Aside
from the perfunctory amendments relating to the introduction of new states into the Union,
the only material changes to the Act include the expansion of the definition of "person," as
well as the procedural elements of the reporting requirement. §§ 375-376. As will be
shown, any assertion that the lack of case law related to the Jenkins Act was the result of
universal compliance is specious.
83. Consumer Mail Order Ass'n of America v. McGrath, 94 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1950),
affd 340 U.S. 925 (1951).
84. McGrath, 94 F. Supp. at 709. The claim was deemed to be abstract because it
sought a declaration that "the statute is unconstitutional without regard to its particular
application to a particular state." Id. at 710.
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Amendment in part because the regulations would allegedly de-
stroy the value of their customer lists, and thus, the plaintiffs'
businesses.85 The court responded to this assertion by stating that
the Jenkins Act would not in any way diminish the value of the
customer lists; cigarette merchants would simply be disclosing
their customers to tax administrators, not competitors. 6 More
importantly though, the court stated: "[I]t cannot be said that the
[reporting] requirement is unreasonable or inappropriate to the
permissible end[s] of Congress to prevent the use of facilities of
interstate commerce in evading or violating state laws." 7 As will
be shown, the court's rationale would later resurface in a series of
Supreme Court decisions; only it would not pertain to the Jenkins
Act, but rather, the scope of Indian sovereignty.
1. The Early Years
Prosecutions under the Jenkins Act waned from already low
levels as the years progressed. On one hand, the threat of puni-
tive sanctions was likely an effective means to prevent violations
of the Jenkins Act, but conversely, the nature of the statutory
penalties and indifference by the DOJ and FBI may have rendered
enforcement of the Jenkins Act nonexistent.
At the time of enactment, § 377 threatened penalties of up to
$1,000 in monetary fines and/or the possibility of not more than
six months in prison.88 In 1949, when the law first became effec-
tive, the potential liability for an interstate cigarette merchant
selling a few cartons of unstamped cigarettes as compared to the
seller's profit margin was dramatic. Indeed, it defies reason for a
legitimate business person to risk incurring a $1,000 fine simply
to capture the purchase of a consumer seeking to buy three car-
tons of Camels for $6.00 in order to save $2.40 in state excise
taxes.89 The deterrent effect, therefore, cannot be overstated, par-
85. Id. at 711.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 377.
89. This hypothetical assumes an 8-cents per pack state excise tax, multiplied by the
thirty packs included in a three-carton purchase. It is not based on precise product costs,
and is simply illustrative of what a consumer might spend for a mail order purchase of
cigarettes in the late-1940s. Explications regarding the effectiveness of § 377 in deterring
violations of the reporting provisions do not take into account black market interstate
transportation and sales of cigarettes, which, if made by non-licensed cigarette merchants,
would not likely be deterred by § 377. In the absence of traditional commercial avenues for
the advertisement, sale, and transportation of cigarettes, there exists simply no economi-
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ticularly in the context of the commercial cigarette market at the
time of enactment. This supposition is further evidenced by the
fact that Congress has not substantively amended § 377 since its
inception over fifty-four years ago.9" Ostensibly, the need for an
enhanced penalty provision has not presented itself.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that the apparent non-
existent enforcement of the Jenkins Act has been the result of the
lenient nature of the § 377 penalties provision. With enforcement
and prosecution for the myriad state and federal laws falling un-
der the aegis of the DOJ and the FBI, it is of little wonder that
there may not be a great incentive for the federal government to
pursue misdemeanor violations for the evasion of state excise
taxes. To wit, Representative Maurice Gwinn Burnside (D-
W.Va.), who opposed the Jenkins Act, noted during floor debate
that "here we have the spectacle of the States asking the Congress
to help enforce their tax laws" and that "it is likely to cost the
Federal Government more money to help the States try to collect
this trickle of funds than it will realize to the States."9' Given the
tax rates involved in contemporary cigarette sales, Representative
Burnside's statement has been rendered largely inaccurate. How-
ever, due to the possible perception of costs versus the benefits to
the federal government in enforcing the Jenkins Act, the assertion
retains an element of truth. As noted above, there are a mere
handful of reported cases where the Jenkins Act was even cited by
the court as being applicable to the underlying offense.92 Indeed,
even when the Jenkins Act is cited, it has often been used as a
defense to preempt the application of a statute that provides for
more stringent penalties. Illustrative of this phenomenon is the
case of United States v. Brewer.93
Brewer involved the prosecution of a defendant for mail fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ("1341") for shipping untaxed cigarettes,
via United States mail, from North Carolina, a state with a low
cigarette tax, to Florida, which imposed a comparatively higher
cigarette excise tax.94 The Jenkins Act, although having been di-
cally feasible means for the DOJ to uncover proscribed, i.e., black market, sales of ciga-
rettes.
90. The Jenkins Act became effective on October 19, 1949. See § 377.
91. 95 CONG. REC. 6347-48.
92. Section 378 states that "[t]he United States district courts shall have jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 378.
93. 401 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
94. Brewer, 401 F. Supp. at 1087.
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rectly implicated by the actions of the defendant, was not applied
for its penalties. Instead, the reporting provision, § 376 was used
as a means to impose the mail fraud statute,95 which provided for
more rigorous penalties than § 377.9" The prosecution sought to
apply the mail fraud statute because the only elements requiring
proof were that the defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud and
that the mails were used to execute the scheme.97 By selling un-
stamped cigarettes through the mails to a low-tax jurisdiction,
there existed prima facie evidence of the defendant's scheme to
defraud that jurisdiction of taxes owed on the commodity.98
Owing to the lax penalties imposed by the Jenkins Act, the de-
fendant predictably claimed that her actions were controlled by §
376 "to the exclusion of prosecution for any other criminal stat-
ute."99 The district court dismissed this argument by stating that
interpreting later statutes to repeal earlier ones by implication,
rather than by a clear directive by Congress, was strongly disfa-
vored.0 0 Absent such a directive, the availability of Jenkins Act
penalties did not preempt prosecution under the mail fraud stat-
ute.
As a separate defense to the fraud statute, the defendant in
Brewer alleged that since the Florida purchasers were liable for
the excise taxes on the purchases, and were obviously cognizant of
the cigarette tax imposed by their state of domicile, then they
could not have been defrauded of any taxes they owed for their
purchases.' ° Such an argument implies that the defendant was
prosecuted for allegedly deceiving her customers, but that it was
these individuals who were the only parties engaged in fraudulent
behavior by evading the Florida excise tax. Had this been ac-
cepted by the court, not only would it have insulated the defen-
dant from guilt under § 1341, but more importantly, it may have
further emasculated the already feeble Jenkins Act by allowing
future defendants to essentially shift liability, under such criminal
statutes as § 1341, to their customers. The defendant's logic im-
plied that were it not for the nefarious actions of her customers,
95. See id.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 provides that persons found guilty under the statute may be sub-
ject to not more than $1,000,000 in fines and/or spend up to thirty years in prison. 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
97. Brewer, 401 F. Supp. at 1087.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing U.S. v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939)).
101. Id. at 1088.
Fall 2003
Duquesne Law Review
then the state would not have been denied the taxes it was owed. °2
This, of course, would have made future prosecutions premised on
violations of the Jenkins Act, as was the case in Brewer, more dif-
ficult to achieve. The court apparently recognized this, and, in
rejecting the defense, observed that Florida would not have been
defrauded of the cigarette taxes owed were it not for the defen-
dant's repeated actions in mailing advertisements, order forms,
and cigarettes in violation of the reporting provision of the Jen-
kins Act.
0 3
2. Disfavor of the Jenkins Act
Absent the government's ability to use § 376 as a means to ap-
ply stronger criminal penalties, the Jenkins Act, as a practical
matter, would be pointless. In Brewer, the court noted that the
Act created a legal duty in the seller that, when violated, opened it
up to prosecution under other criminal statutes.0 4 Although the
characterization of the Jenkins Act as simply creating a legal duty
is perfectly understandable from a punitive standpoint - the Act
itself imposes nothing more than misdemeanor penalties - this
view appears to have fostered the belief that where a violation is
not particularly egregious (e.g., blanket advertisements proclaim-
ing immunity from the reporting provisions of the Jenkins Act), or
has not resulted in large scale revenue deprivation to a state, then
application of the Act is pointless. That is, if the government is
not likely to have the ability to prosecute an interstate cigarette
merchant under a felony criminal statute, then it will not expend
valuable resources investigating possible violations of § 376. Ac-
cordingly, there exists then nearly unlimited potential for an in-
terstate cigarette merchant to push the envelope and evade inves-
tigation and prosecution founded on violations of the Jenkins Act.
If, for example, the government is notified that a cigarette mer-
chant is selling small quantities through the mails, but estimates
that the amounts involved do not rise to felony levels, then it is
not likely to initiate a full investigation to determine the precise
scope of the operation and the potential revenue deprivation to the
state(s) involved. Should the seller decide to create several sepa-
rate legal entities to diffuse its operation, the outcome may be that
the government will decline initiating full investigations because,
102. See id.




upon cursory inspection, the sales made by the separate entities
may not appear to warrant individual investigation or prosecu-
tion. The potential for gamesmanship highlights the flawed logic
of treating the Jenkins Act as nothing more than a litmus test for
determining the eligibility of other criminal penalties, to say noth-
ing of the collective revenue impact to states and the equity issues
involved to in-state cigarette merchants. °5
Notwithstanding the reticence of the DOJ and the FBI to actu-
ally investigate and prosecute violations under the Jenkins Act,
there also exists the likelihood that federal law enforcement agen-
cies will often be the last to learn of possible violations of the Act.
Indeed, in Brewer, it was not the FBI that uncovered the cigarette
deliveries into Florida, or even investigated the defendant for that
matter, but rather, it was an investigation initiated by the United
States Postal Service.0 6 Despite the fact that the FBI retains in-
vestigative authority for violations of the reporting requirements,
the Postal Service and other common carriers, in handling pack-
aged cigarette cartons, are often in a much better position to initi-
ate and follow through with investigations of Jenkins Act viola-
tions. As will be illustrated in the following subsection, the lack of
involvement by the DOJ and FBI in curtailing the marketing and
sale of tax-free cigarettes via interstate commerce has impelled
some states to unilaterally enforce excise tax collection statutes. 17
In addition to the difficulties of attacking the problem of Internet
and mail order cigarette sales in such a piecemeal fashion (e.g.,
limited state resources, reduced compliance by vendors where
there is no threat of federal intervention), unilateral state efforts
have been hindered when the targeted merchants invoke the pro-
tection of tribal sovereignty.0 8
C. Contemporary Enforcement
The advent of the Internet has made it possible for merchants
and consumers to enter into commercial transactions with greater
efficiency and without regard to geographical boundaries. In no
area is this more evident than the sale and purchase of tobacco
105. In-state cigarette merchants are placed at a competitive disadvantage where out-of-
state cigarette merchants are permitted, either tacitly in the case of those operating from
Indian lands or implicitly where the government declines to investigate and prosecute
violations of the Jenkins Act, to market cigarettes absent state imposed excise taxes.
106. See Brewer, 401 F. Supp. at 1086.
107. See infra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. See also infra note 354.
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products. Consumers no longer need to patronize local merchants
to obtain cigarettes and other forms of tobacco, but rather, they
can order directly from a producer or middleman regardless of
their location. Historically, consumer choice was somewhat lim-
ited by the efforts of the seller to market and advertise in a given
jurisdiction, but the Internet has enabled the seller to become the
passive party and maintain nothing more than a website to create
a market with potential customers. In most circumstances,'0 9 the
Internet has replaced the traditional, and cumbersome, mail order
system of targeted advertisements, order forms, processing of per-
sonal checks or money orders, and lengthy transaction times with
the more efficient and cost-effective method of online ordering and
instant approval."0 In light of the practical advantages presented
to both sellers and buyers vis-A-vis Internet sales, it is not surpris-
ing that the traditional system of mail order sales has become
something of an anachronism.
1. Remote Vendors
Internet sales made by remote vendors have brought about myr-
iad challenges to state taxing authorities with respect to their au-
thority to assess and collect sales and use taxes on transactions
conducted online."' Two of the most notable challenges to state
taxing authority arising under this expansive area of the law that




Determining situs, or location, of an Internet transaction can of-
ten be exigent to a state that seeks to assess sales or use tax on a
good purchased via electronic commerce."3 In a traditional brick-
109. Online merchants have lured potential customers to their websites by handing out
advertisements proclaiming cigarettes at cut rate prices. Hancock, supra note 6. The au-
thor has also found similar promotional materials inserted in major Connecticut newspa-
pers.
110. See, e.g., http://www.nativeamericansmokeshop.com/cheap-cigarettes.htm (indicat-
ing that only credit cards can be used to purchase products, thus enabling the vendor to
immediately approve or disapprove purchases) (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
111. While beyond the scope of this Article, for a general overview of the state taxation
issues implicated by Internet sales of services, see generally, George B. Delta, State Taxa-
tion of the Internet: A Review of Some Issues, 7 WILLAMETTE J. IN'L L. & DIsP. RESOL. 136
(2000).
112. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277.
113. Delta, supra note 111, at 145.
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and-mortar transaction the situs of the sale can easily be deter-
mined - it is the location of the customer and the merchant.H
4
However, where the transaction is made online between the
buyer, located in one state, the seller, who may be located in a dif-
ferent state, and where the product may still be delivered to an
individual in a third state, determining the state that has proper
taxing authority over the transaction may become quite confus-
ing.115 Despite this challenge, the Jenkins Act has essentially ren-
dered moot the issue of situs in the context of online cigarette
sales and, consequently, the question of the appropriate taxing
authority.
The reporting requirements of § 376 clearly indicate that the
state of delivery is to be provided with transaction information so
that the tax administrator can impose the applicable levy. The
requirements of § 376 apply to any person that sells cigarettes for
profit in "interstate commerce, whereby such cigarettes are
shipped into a State taxing the sale or use of cigarettes,""6 but is
not predicated on whether the state is the appropriate taxing ju-
risdiction. Thus, a remote vendor could theoretically mount a suc-
cessful challenge to a state that seeks to impose the reporting re-
quirements, yet still potentially be held legally liable for failing to
report customer information to such state in the month following
the sale.
b. ITFA
It is believed by some that the Internet Tax Freedom Act insu-
lates remote cigarette vendors from the reporting requirements of
the § 376."' However, this is merely a popular misconception of
the scope of the ITFA. The IFTA was enacted in 1998 and "im-
poses [nothing more than] a national moratorium on state and
local taxes imposed on Internet access services, [e.g., dial-up or
broadband connection fees,] and multiple or discriminatory taxes
on electronic commerce."1 ' As the Jenkins Act does not itself im-
pose a tax on online cigarette sales, and therefore cannot be mul-
tiple or discriminatory in the context of the ITFA, then the IFTA
114. Edward A. Morse, State Taxation of Internet Commerce: Something New Under the
Sun?, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1113, 1156 (1997) (discussing state challenges with the taxa-
tion of Internet commerce).
115. Delta, supra note 111, at 145.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 376 (emphasis added).
117. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
118. Delta, supra note 111, at 157.
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offers no protection from the Jenkins Act to remote vendors or
consumers of cigarettes sold online.
2. GAO Report
The increasing prevalence of online cigarette sales has
prompted a great deal of concern from tax administrators."9 As
states increase cigarette excise taxes, and accordingly their reli-
ance on such revenue sources, noncompliance with the Jenkins
Act by remote vendors will lead to adverse consequences,12 ° includ-
ing reductions in general state revenues, as well as funding for
compensatory health care programs and tobacco prevention and
cessation initiatives. To address this burgeoning threat, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office ("GAO") in 2002 released a report to Con-
gress summarizing recent state undertakings regarding the Jen-
kins Act, federal involvement in the investigation and enforce-
ment of alleged reporting violations by remote vendors, and outlin-
ing several possible approaches to strengthen and increase com-
pliance with § 376 and the penalties enumerated under § 377.2
a. Data
The GAO report tracked the efforts of nine states to collect in-
formation from remote vendors regarding Internet cigarette sales
to customers located within their jurisdictions. 122 Officials in each
of the states expressed concern about the revenue impact of non-
compliance with the Jenkins Act, and California separately esti-
mated that they lost approximately $13 million during a four-
month period in 2001 attributable solely to Internet sales. 123 This
is unsurprising given the number of online cigarette merchants in
operation. At the time the data was compiled, the GAO had iden-
tified no less than 147 online cigarette vendors operating within
119. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
120. Id. at 1.
121. See id. at 1-2.
122. Alaska ($1), California ($.87), Hawaii ($1), Iowa ($.36), Maine ($1), Massachusetts
($.76), Rhode Island ($1), Washington ($1.42), and Wisconsin ($.77). Id. at n.3. The states'
respective excise tax amounts have been indicated in parentheses. Id. at 5. These rates
were current at the time data was compiled for the GAO report in January 2002 and in
some cases do not reflect the current excise tax rates. For example, Massachusetts practi-
cally doubled its cigarette tax, from $.76 to $1.51, in mid-2002. See Bruce Mohl, Pack Men-
tality Taxes Send Smokers Looking for Deals in N.H., on Net, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10,
2002, at D1. The states selected for the report boast some of the highest cigarette tax rates
in the nation and thus stand to lose the most from evasions of § 376.
123. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.
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the United States,'24 of which seventy-eight percent indicated on
their web pages that they do not comply with the Jenkins Act.'25
Of this number, sixteen percent of the vendors claimed, inter alia,
Indian status to avoid their reporting responsibilities, and a small
percentage (five percent) posted notices to their customers of their
reporting responsibilities under the Jenkins Act with the caveat
that they would not adhere to their legal duties under the Act.
126
b. Findings
The findings of the report highlight two predominant themes:
(1) States lack the legal authority to enforce the provisions of the
Jenkins Act, and (2) federal involvement in enforcement of the Act
has been virtually nonexistent.
Independent of soliciting federal assistance, several states have
pursued unilateral approaches to encourage reporting compli-
ance. 127 As discussed above, the DOJ and FBI, unfortunately, are
likely to be the last parties to learn of Jenkins Act evasions for the
simple reason that they have no direct involvement with state tax
administration. Therefore, state revenue and tax departments
have proactively sought out remote vendors that affirmatively re-
fuse to comply with the Jenkins Act to then notify them of their
reporting responsibilities. 128  Tax administrators have become
aware of advertisements boasting of tax-free cigarettes, 29 or been
placed on notice through media broadcasts and publications.
After learning of remote vendors selling cigarettes tax-free, states
have attempted to obtain customer lists by contacting the vendors
via mail and phone, albeit with little success.131
Even where the taxing jurisdiction is able to identify remote
vendors, there exists the problem of limited resources for follow-up
efforts. It is to be expected that remote vendors are unwilling to
comply with state information requests since these are generally
made on an intermittent basis with no real threat of consequential
124. Massachusetts has identified 262 remote cigarette vendors. Id. at 13.
125. Id. at 3-4.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 11.
128. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.
129. Id.
130. Hancock, supra note 6.
131. Of the 262 remote vendors identified by Massachusetts, the state managed to elicit
responses from only thirteen, or 5% of those contacted. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 11,
13.
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legal action. Massachusetts indicated that, starting in July 2000,
they dedicated one employee, for approximately three months, to
periodically contact Internet cigarette vendors regarding their re-
porting obligations under the Jenkins Act.'32 Such a paltry dedica-
tion of resources is somewhat startling given the stakes involved;
the state assesses an excise tax of $15.10 per carton of cigarettes
and a use tax that may exceed $1.50 per carton.'33 Given this es-
timate, Massachusetts would lose $1 million in tax revenue on
approximately every 60,000 cartons sold to instate residents
through remote vendors.
Recognizing the near futility of periodic correspondence, some
states have engaged in more creative approaches to solve the
revenue dilemma. Connecticut, for example, has sought to quell
the flow of cigarettes purchased online by enforcing a law that
proscribes the transportation of unstamped cigarettes.' Because
unstamped packages of cigarettes are, by definition, untaxed ciga-
rettes, any state that imposes an excise tax could permissibly seize
unstamped cigarettes as contraband,"5 absent special documenta-
tion as to why the cigarettes have not been stamped.'36 To effectu-
ate these efforts, Connecticut has enlisted the aid of common car-
riers37 by notifying them that the state will intercept their deliver-
ies and seize shipments of untaxed cigarettes."8 Although threat-
ening to choke off the delivery vehicle between remote vendors
and their customers is an innovative means of encouraging report-
ing compliance, the scope of its effectiveness is limited. As a prac-
tical matter, the approach is only useful as a scare tactic; no state
has resources so abundant that they could interdict every ship-
ment of cigarettes made via common carrier, nor would they wish
to expend valuable resources to seize what could ultimately turn
132. Id. at 12.
133. Massachusetts imposes a use tax of $.05 on every $1 of cigarettes sold online to
consumers in the state. Assuming a hypothetical carton price of $30, the state would stand
to collect $1.50 on each carton sold online.
134. Setze, supra note 14.
135. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 514
(1991).
136. Setze, supra note 14.
137. A "common carrier" is defined as "[a] carrier that is required by law to transport
passengers or freight, without refusal, if the ... charge is paid." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
205 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, a "private (or contract) carrier" is defined as "[a] carrier
that is not bound to accept business from the general public . . . ." Id. For the purposes of
cigarette delivery, remote vendors may employ contract carriers that would not be party to
the agreements with state revenue departments to assist in the interdiction of deliveries of
untaxed cigarettes.
138. Setze, supra note 14.
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out to be a two-carton delivery. It would seem that simply obtain-
ing the name of the recipient from the common carrier and send-
ing the individual an estimated tax bill for their purchase would
be a better use of a state's limited resources.
Another drawback of this approach is that the state is at the
mercy of common carriers that may or may not decide to provide
notification that it is in possession of untaxed cigarettes. For ex-
ample, if a carrier does a great deal of business with a particular
vendor, it may decide that the risk of potential legal challenges
with a state is worth the future business with that vendor. More-
over, should a remote vendor decide to forego using a common car-
rier and instead enter into an exclusive delivery agreement with a
contract carrier, then the state may lose a valuable resource that
would enable it to identify those operating in violation of the Jen-
kins Act, not to mention the customers who are ultimately respon-
sible for payment of the excise tax.
3. Solicitation of Federal Assistance
The above approaches underscore the fact that the states lack
adequate legal authority and resources to successfully enjoin vio-
lations of the Jenkins Act. Accordingly, concurrent with inde-
pendent enforcement initiatives, states have also attempted to
solicit the assistance of the federal government.'39 Despite the no-
table efforts made by some jurisdictions to encourage reporting
compliance, and the universal concern about violations of the Act
among the states participating in the GAO study, neither the DOJ
nor the FBI have taken any actions to enforce § 376.140 This is un-
surprising given that the FBI does not dedicate any personnel to
investigating possible violations of the Jenkins Act, either inde-
pendently or in connection with unrelated ongoing investiga-
tions,' nor does it appear to track investigations that may be ini-
tiated by other agencies. Similarly, the DOJ does not compile or
maintain statistical data on possible violations of the Jenkins Act
or maintain resources used to investigate or prosecute offenders."'
Although the absence of data may be attributable to the fact that
139. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 13-14 (noting that seven of the states participating
in the study made efforts to promote Jenkins Act compliance, and of this number, three
states notified and/or attempted to enlist the assistance of the DOJ).
140. Id. at 2.




the government has not been actively engaged in enforcement of
the Act in the recent past, congressional testimony by the Comp-
troller General has indicated that the DOJ and FBI have focused
their resources on countering the threat of domestic terrorism ,
which is likely to be a lasting endeavor. According to the DOJ,
their level of involvement in investigating state referrals for pos-
sible Jenkins Act violations has been limited by the fact that the
Act itself creates misdemeanor penalties which, when compared to
other national law enforcement priorities, do not constitute a
pressing concern.!
Indeed, there exist several documented cases where in spite of
strong evidence that Jenkins Act violations have occurred, U.S.
Attorneys offices have declined to intervene and provide needed
legal support to the states involved. In 2000, Iowa and Wisconsin
had identified several Internet cigarette vendors operating in vio-
lation of the Jenkins Act and requested the assistance of three
U.S. Attorneys in sending letters to the vendors informing them of
their reporting duties under the Act. 4 1 Iowa and Wisconsin of-
fered to coordinate all aspects of the mailing, including drafting
the correspondence, and simply requested the U.S. Attorneys sub-
scribe to the letters so to lend credence to the states' efforts.' Of
the three U.S. Attorneys contacted, only two bothered to respond,
and even then in the negative, by indicating that they were not
interested in providing the needed assistance to the states.'47 Al-
though, as a general matter, federal prosecutors do not typically
issue what could later be construed as an advisory opinion, for the
reason that it could later form the basis of legal dispute should
prosecution occur, it is difficult to perceive how a letter notifying a
remote vendor of their legal duty under the Jenkins Act could be
construed as an advisory opinion, particularly since U.S. Attor-
neys are the only persons legally empowered to enforce the Act
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 533.148
The DOJ has on other occasions evinced a clear desire to avoid
involvement with enforcement of the Jenkins Act. In 2001, the
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Section 533 provides that, except where otherwise assigned by law, the Attorney
General may appoint officials "to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States."
15 U.S.C. § 533 (2001).
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State of Washington was referred by the FBI to the U.S. Attor-
ney's office regarding Jenkins Act violations by a remote vendor
that repeatedly refused to report customer lists claiming protec-
tion of the ITFA.'49 In response to Washington's request, the U.S
Attorney declined to intervene and instead advised the state to
pursue civil remedies before initiating a criminal action under the
Jenkins Act.50 Another example involving the state of Wisconsin
occurred in 2001 when the state made a number of controlled ciga-
rette purchases from a remote vendor generating clear evidence
that the § 376 had been violated.' After notifying the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office of the violations and requesting prosecution of the
vendor, the DOJ decided not to initiate further investigation or
prosecution and instead requested that the state handle the mat-
ter administratively,' despite the fact that no state possesses the
administrative means to enjoin violations of the Jenkins Act.
4. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
The only federal agency willing and able to assist states in ob-
taining compliance with the Jenkins Act is the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF). '53 Armed with the resources and
expertise to spearhead investigations against violators of tobacco
regulations, the ATF currently maintains primary authority to
enforce federal excise taxes and criminal laws related to tobacco
products.' The ATF's involvement with tobacco regulation and
the federal excise tax includes the collection of levies, permit ap-
proval for tobacco producers, importers and exporters, as well as
ensuring tax compliance by such parties.'55 The only direct in-
volvement with the Jenkins Act by the ATF is through the en-
forcement of the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act ("CCTA"),
which establishes felony penalties for any person that is found to
be shipping, distributing, transporting, receiving, possessing, sell-
ing, or purchasing more than 60,000 cigarettes, or 300 cartons,
that do not bear evidence of excise tax payment to the state in
149. See GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 14-15.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 10.
154. Id. at 8.
155. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 8.
Fall 2003
Duquesne Law Review
which the cigarettes are found. 56 Unfortunately, given the high
threshold that a vendor or buyer must satisfy before the ATF will
investigate possible Jenkins Act violations, there will be few occa-
sions where it will even be permissible for the ATF to provide sub-
stantive assistance to states. Indeed, there is effectively no differ-
ence between the requisite violations of the Jenkins Act that will
spur the involvement of the ATF and the DOJ or FBI.157 Though it
should be noted that the ATF has committed to Connecticut that it
will contact cigarette distributors to inform them that some of
their retail clientele may be defrauding the state of tax revenue by
committing mail or wire fraud,5 ' the ATF does not have principal
authority to enforce the Jenkins Act, and therefore, will be unable
to provide the assistance needed to adequately address the prob-
lem of remote vendor cigarette sales. 9
Further constraining the ATF's involvement in investigating
possible Jenkins Act violations is that many remote vendors are
aware of the CCTA and accordingly limit the number of cartons
that can be purchased at any one time.6° Of the remote vendors
surveyed in the GAO report, a considerable percentage posted a
maximum number of cartons that can be purchased per order,
ranging from two cartons to 300 cartons."' And while many ven-
dors do not post a maximum number of cartons that can be pur-
chased, some will flag large purchases for manual processing,1
62
thus giving them the ability to control all purchases that may po-
tentially subject them to prosecution under the CCTA
16
1
In the few situations where the ATF has sought to enjoin possi-
ble violations of the CCTA in conjunction with violations of the
Jenkins Act," the results have been less than promising. Indica-
tive of such efforts was a situation in 1997 in Alaska where the
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2342 (2000). The CCTA does not apply to any quantity of cigarettes
sold to an Indian vendor on tribal lands because § 2342 is only applicable to the possessions
of cigarettes in states that require the excise tax payment. Tribal lands are not considered
states for the purposes of the CCTA. Penalties under the CCTA are enumerated in the
United States Sentencing Guidelines and will vary according to amount of tax evaded. U.S.
SENTENCING GUmELINES MANUAL § 2T4.1 (2001).
157. A vendor must perpetrate a felony before federal authorities will even intervene on
a state's behalf. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
158. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 10.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 20.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 10.
164. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 8-9.
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ATF was notified by the Alaska Department of Revenue ("DOR")
that a remote vendor, operating under the auspices of an Indian
tribe, was selling cigarettes to individuals situated in state, and
therefore, in violation of the reporting requirements of the Jenkins
Act.165 After determining that the vendor was not in violation of
the CCTA,'66 the state and ATF requested that the U.S. Attorney
prosecute the vendor on the basis of a Jenkins Act violation.'67
Endemic to all instances of DOJ involvement in the Act, the U.S.
Attorney declined to prosecute a misdemeanor offense and instead
requested that a determination be made as to whether a felony
had been committed before they would assist the state.6 ' Follow-
ing confirmation by an ATF and Postal Service task force that the
Indian vendor had indeed committed mail fraud, the U.S. Attor-
ney filed a grand jury indictment premised upon a violation of the
fraud statute but not for § 376.169 After the grand jury denied the
indictment, 170 the U.S. Attorney belatedly notified the vendor that
they were in violation of the Jenkins Act and that they must com-
ply with the reporting provision of § 376.17' According to the
Alaska DOR, the vendor had not complied with the U.S. Attor-




Given the ineffectual involvement of the DOJ and the FBI in the
investigation and enforcement of Jenkins Act violations, the states
involved in the GAO study, as well as the ATF, have advocated for
shifting primary investigative authority to the latter agency. 173 It
is believed that transferring investigative and enforcement re-
165. Id. at 8.
166. The state of Alaska did not require that excise tax stamps be affixed to cigarette
packages as proof that the state taxes had been paid. Id. at 8 n.9.
167. Id. at 9.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(e) prohibits the disclosure of mat-
ters occurring before a grand jury, the DOJ did not disclose the reason the indictment was
denied. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 9 n.ll.
171. Id. at 9.
172. Id. It should be noted that the U.S. Attorneys post-indictment involvement in this
matter directly contradicts the DOJ's informal policy against issuing "advisory opinions" in
prosecutorial matters. This suggests that the U.S. Attorneys purported reason for not
joining the Iowa and Wisconsin correspondence was fictitious, and was instead based upon
their reservations against pursuing Jenkins Act violations at any stage.
173. Id. at 10, 21.
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sponsibilities to the ATF will increase enforcement on a national
level.'74 This view is attributable to the fact that the ATF is cur-
rently responsible for enforcement of the CCTA and already main-
tains specialists in the areas of excise tax and tobacco regulation
compliance.' Through the allocation of the ATF's skilled re-
sources for Jenkins Act specific investigations, compliance and
enforcement are projected to far surpass that of the present day.
7 6
Another proposal offered by the DOJ and ATF includes making
Jenkins Act violations felonies instead of misdemeanors. 7 7 If the
deterrence effect of § 377 was indeed a valid reason for the lack of
prosecutions under the original Act, then perhaps making the
penalties commensurate with the financial impact to the states
involved will encourage future compliance with the reporting re-
quirements under § 376. The ATF has also suggested that the
Jenkins Act be amended to allow states to pursue injunctions in
federal court without the involvement of the DOJ, that the mail-
ing of cigarettes through the U.S. Postal Service be prohibited, or
that restrictions be enacted on how common carriers can deliver
cigarettes, including notification requirements to states prior to
the delivery of untaxed cigarettes.' However reasonable such
proposals may appear, they will likely fall short of enjoining the
proliferation of and sale by retailers operating from tribal lands,
who constitute the most intractable group of remote cigarette ven-
dors.
The challenges encountered by the states and, in the few occa-
sions where they have been meaningfully involved, federal agen-
cies, in their attempts to increase remote vendor compliance with
the Jenkins Act, nowhere are more evident than with Indian ciga-
rette merchants.' 79 Indeed, of the 147 remote cigarette vendors
identified in the GAO report, approximately sixty-percent are con-
firmed to be owned and/or operated by Indians on tribal lands. 8'
And of the vendors indicating that they are exempt from collecting
state cigarette taxes, and thus the reporting requirements of the
Jenkins Act, roughly ninety-percent claim sovereign immunity
insulates them from responsibility under § 376, or because they
174. Id.
175. Id. at 10-11.
176. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 10-11.
177. Id. at 21.
178. Id.
179. See infra notes 182-196 and accompanying text.
180. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 17.
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are Indian-operated businesses."' Hence, whether Congress
should ultimately decide to enhance the penalty provisions of §
377, transfer enforcement responsibilities exclusively to the ATF,
or adopt the various other recommendations put forward by fed-
eral law enforcement agencies, resistance that states have encoun-
tered from Indian tribes and merchants when trying to collect
cigarette excise taxes portends further disappointment for state
tax administrators in this area.
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. Preface
On April 20, 1997, Seneca Indians from the Cattaraugus Reser-
vation in Western New York State staged a violent demonstration
protesting the state's attempt to implement a tax collection pro-
gram for cigarettes and gasoline sold by Indian retailers to non-
Indians.'82 Following six years of legal wrangling and high-profile
political battles," nearly 1,000 Seneca Indians and supporters
collectively stopped traffic on the New York Thruway and became
embroiled in a violent scuffle with the state police that resulted in
several injured officers, damaged police cruisers, and numerous
Indian arrests."' The precipitating cause of the demonstration
was New York's "virtual blockade"'85 of gasoline and cigarette de-
liveries to stores operated by members of the Seneca Nation as the
result of the Indians' failure to collect taxes imposed on gasoline
and cigarette sales to non-Indians.'86
181. Id.
182. Karen L. Folster, Comment, Just Cheap Butts, Or An Equal Protection Violation?:
New York's Failure to Tax Reservation Sales to Non-Indians, 62 ALBANY L. REV. 697, 707
(1998) (discussing possible equal protection claims for non-Indian cigarette and gasoline
retailers against the State of New York on the basis of its selective enforcement of state
taxation statutes).
183. See id. at 697-98.
184. Michael Beebe & Harold McNeil, Roads Open After Melee; 11 Arrested on Second
Day of Protests By Senecas, 12 Troopers Hurt in Clash, BuFFALO NEWS, Apr. 21, 1997, at
1A (discussing violent Indian protests resulting from Governor Pataki's efforts to encourage
the collection of gasoline and cigarette taxes from sales made on Indian lands to non-
Indians).
185. William Glaberson, For Seneca Leader, A Battle on 2 Fronts; Trying to Unite Frac-
tured Tribe While Fighting State Over Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at B1 (discussing
intra-tribal politics of the Seneca Nation in the context of the tribe's legal and public chal-
lenges with the state of New York regarding the collection of gasoline and cigarette taxes
on sales to non-Indians).
186. Folster, supra note 182, at 707.
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1. The Problem
In 1988, then-Governor Mario Cuomo instituted tax regulations
aimed at curtailing tax evasion by non-Indians for cigarettes and
gasoline purchased from retailers operating on Indian reserva-
tions.' Because Indians and Indian tribes are exempt from state
taxation statutes, '88 retailers operating from Indian reservations
in New York and other states that impose an excise tax on ciga-
rettes are able to purchase unstamped cigarettes from wholesalers
for resale to tribal members.' Indian cigarette retailers, however,
never collected the taxes from non-Indian customers, which gave
them a competitive advantage over their non-tribal counterparts
and resulted in, according to New York tax officials, revenue
losses for the state of up to $300 million per year. 190
2. The Scheme
In an effort to remedy this problem, New York enacted regula-
tions that in part required all Indian merchants to register with
the state Department of Taxation and Finance in order to legally
market cigarettes.'' The regulations effectively limited the num-
ber of unstamped cigarette packages that an Indian retailer would
be entitled to sell according to "probable demand, "192 which was to
be determined on the basis of statewide cigarette consumption and
the number of enrolled tribal members.1 3  The regulations also
mandated that proof of tribal membership be provided prior to the
purchase of unstamped cigarettes, and that retailers compile de-
tailed records of all tax-free sales for periodic submittal to the De-
187. Id. at 701.
188. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1972).
189. Folster, supra note 182, at 701.
190. Id.
191. "A tribe may enter into an agreement with the Department 'to regulate, license, or
control the sale and distribution [of cigarettes] within its qualified reservation.'" Depart-
ment of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 65 (1994) (quoting 20
N.Y.C.R.R. § 336.6(a) (1992)).
192. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. at 66.
193. Folster, supra note 182, at 701. Note that a tribe could have challenged the formu-
laic allotment by entering into an agreement with the Department of Taxation and Fi-
nance. See Mishell B. Kneeland, Note, State Taxation of On-Reservation Purchases by Non-
Indians: Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 48 TAX LAW. 883, 884
(1995) (discussing the doctrines of Indian sovereign immunity and federal preemption in
the context of the Supreme Court's decision in Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros.).
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partment of Taxation and Finance."' The crucial element of the
new regulations removed from the Indian retailer the power to sell
unstamped cigarettes to non-Indians by requiring the wholesaler
to pre-collect the tax on all cigarettes purchased for resale on
tribal lands. '95 Prior to implementation though, a group of whole-
salers challenged the validity of the regulations alleging that they
were preempted by the federal Indian Trader Statutes.196
3. The Challenge
The New York Appellate Division initially affirmed the chal-
lenger's argument that the state regulations were preempted by
the Indian Trader Statutes and issued an injunction preventing
the state from implementing the tax scheme. 97 The New York
Court of Appeals declined the opportunity to review the decision of
the lower court and the state's appeal was granted certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment of
the Appellate Division and remanded back for additional consid-
eration.198 Having received their marching orders, the Appellate
194. Id. at 884.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 884-85. The Indian Trader Statutes govern who may engage in trade rela-
tions with Indians and Indian tribes and are codified in part in 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (2002).
25 U.S.C. § 262 provides in pertinent part that:
Any person desiring to trade with the Indians on any Indian reservation land shall,
upon establishing the fact, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
that he is a proper person to engage in such trade, be permitted to do so under such
rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may prescribe for the
protection of said Indians.
§ 262.
The underlying argument of the wholesalers was that federal Bureau of Indian
Affairs granted them the right to engage in trade with Indians and Indian tribes and that
the state tax collection regulations burdened such commercial relationships by interfering
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs' exclusive entitlement to regulate in this area.
The purpose of the Indian Trader Statutes was "to prevent fraud and other abuses by per-
sons trading with Indians." See Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. at 71.
197. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 164 A.D.2d 300 (1990).
198. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. at 68. The Court vacated the judgment of the
lower court on the basis of its decision in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawa-
tomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), where it held in pertinent part that:
Although the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity applies to the Potawatomis, that
doctrine does not excuse a tribe from all obligations to assist in the collection of val-
idly imposed state sales taxes. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). Oklahoma argues that the Potawatomis' tribal sovereign
immunity notwithstanding, it has the authority to tax sales of cigarettes to nonmem-
bers of the Tribe at the Tribe's convenience store. We agree. In Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), this Court held that Indian retailers
on an Indian reservation may be required to collect all state taxes applicable to sales
to non-Indians. We determined that requiring the tribal seller to collect these taxes
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Division thereafter affirmed the state regulations. The Court of
Appeals, however, subsequently entered the fray and reversed on
the grounds that the Indian Trader Statutes proscribed the state
from instituting any regulatory provisions on merchants licensed
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to engage in trade with Indians
and Indian tribes. '99 The court concluded that regulations imposed
"significant" burdens on the cigarette wholesalers by "dictat[ing]
to Indian traders the number of unstamped cigarettes they can
sell to reservation Indians and direct with whom they may
trade."0 ° Additionally, the Court of Appeals distinguished the Su-
preme Court's language in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Tribe2"' by indicating that the relevant legal issue was
preemption of the state's regulatory provisions by the Indian
Trader Statutes and not the doctrine of tribal sovereign immu-
nity."2 Had tribal immunity been used as the legal paradigm by
the court, it is quite likely that the New York Court of Appeals
would have affirmed the regulations. Following this decision, the
Supreme Court again granted certiorari and reversed the decision
of the lower court.20 3
4. Milhelm Attea (Round II)
Justice Stevens authored the Milhelm Attea & Bros. opinion for
a unanimous Court."' In doing so, he eschewed the categorical
preemption analysis used by the Court of Appeals and instead
employed a balancing test consisting of "a particularized inquiry
into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake,
an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context,
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law."20 5 The
was a minimal burden justified by the State's interest in assuring the payment of
these concededly lawful taxes.
Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 512.
Although the Potawatomi Court upheld the imposition of tax collection require-
ments on Indians for cigarette sales to non-Indians, it concurrently held that tribal sover-
eign immunity precluded a lawsuit from being initiated by the State of Oklahoma against
the Potawatomi tribe for the collection of $2.7 million in back cigarette taxes owned to the
state. Id. at 507.
199. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. at 68.
200. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 81 N.Y.2d at 427.
201. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
202. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 81 N.Y.2d at 425.
203. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. at 69.
204. Id. at 62.




Court concluded that the ultimate incidence of the taxes involved
in New York's regulatory scheme fell upon non-Indian customers
and not on the wholesalers, i.e., Indian traders, or on the tribes or
tribal members.0 6 As the state possesses a strong and valid inter-
est in ensuring tax compliance by those persons upon whom it can
validly assess such taxes - and who could otherwise evade the pay-
ment of such taxes by purchasing cigarettes on tribal lands - the
Court therefore deemed that New York's interests outweighed the
"tribes' modest interest in offering a tax exemption to customers
who would ordinarily shop elsewhere." 7
5. Epilogue
It was not until nearly two years after the Supreme Court's de-
cision that Governor Pataki made public the state's intention to
begin enforcement of the 1988 regulations. 28 Although the dead-
line for implementation was postponed several times, due primar-
ily to resistance by Indian tribes, the New York Supreme Court
ordered the state, in August 1996, to begin collecting cigarette
taxes from on-reservation sales to non-Indians or else cease col-
lecting the excise tax statewide. °9 The state ultimately entered
into an agreement with several Indian tribes whereby the tribes
would institute reservation based sales taxes on cigarette pur-
chases that, although they would still be lower than state excise
taxes, were intended to contract the price disparity with non-
Indian vendors and thus mitigate the incentive for consumers to
patronize Indian retailers.210 The Seneca Nation, however, was
not party to the agreement and, on April 4, 1997, the state began
enforcement of the regulations by prohibiting all cigarette and
gasoline deliveries to reservation lands, subsequently igniting
public protests... and the resultant violence that occurred on the
New York Thruway just over two weeks later.212
Following the debacle on the New York Thruway, Michael
Schindler, President of the Seneca Nation, addressed his nation's
ongoing dispute with the Department of Taxation and Finance
indignantly by stating that it was "unthinkable" to provide the
206. Id. at 73.
207. Id.
208. Folster, supra note 182, at 704.
209. Id. at 704-06.
210. Id. at 706.
211. Glaberson, supra note 185, at B1.
212. Folster, supra note 182, at 707.
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state with "detailed information about Indian commerce" given the
sovereign status of the Senecas and their right of self govern-
ment. Negotiations to resolve the impasse between the Senecas
and the state were never resolved, and, shortly before Memorial
Day in 1997, following threats of future demonstrations, 24 Gover-
nor Pataki capitulated and indicated that he would send a bill to
the state legislature that would "allow reservation stores to sell
tax-free cigarettes . . . to all New Yorkers."215 Commenting to
tribal leaders at a news conference, the Governor stated: "[I]t is
your land. We respect your sovereignty, and if the Legislature
acts as I am requesting, you will have the right to sell tax-free...
cigarettes free from interference."26  The regulations were for-
mally repealed the following year.217
B. Evolution
In what was perhaps the most visible challenge to a state's au-
thority to collect excise and sales taxes from cigarettes sold by In-
dian vendors, New York yielded when faced with the threat of
public protest; this despite a significant legal victory in the na-
tion's highest court and compromise with five of the state's nine
Indian nations.2 "8 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision
in Milhelm Attea & Bros., the State of New York, and indeed all
states with residents that are able to access the Internet, are es-
sentially back to square one in their attempts to secure compli-
ance by Indian retailers to assist in the collection of cigarette ex-
cise taxes for sales made to non-Indians.
Just as states are escalating excise taxes to their highest rates
ever in order to fund health care initiatives and compensate for
revenue shortfalls,"9 enforcement of the Jenkins Act is virtually
nonexistent with regard to Internet sales,22 ° with little hope for
future compliance. In light of these developments, several ques-
213. Glaberson, supra note 185, at B1.
214. Folster, supra note 182, at 708 n.93.
215. Agnes Palazzetti, Indians Win Sales-Tax Battle; Pataki Orders Repeal of Rule On
Gas, Cigarette Levy, BUFFALO NEWS, May 23, 1997, at 1A (discussing Governor Pataki's
decision to cease enforcement of the state tax regulations).
216. Id.
217. Folster, supra note 182, at 709.
218. Raymond Hernandez, Pataki and 5 Indian Tribes Reach Deal On Imposing Sales
Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1997, at B6 (discussing the state/tribal compromise for collection of
sales and excise taxes for on-reservation cigarette sales).
219. See supra note 5.
220. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
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tions emerge. Specifically, is there legitimacy to tribal arguments
that the doctrine of sovereignty prohibits the imposition of any
state tax regulations on Indian cigarette vendors? Since the Jen-
kins Act has never been challenged as violating tribal sovereignty,
it begs the question: How instructive is Supreme Court precedent
in predicting whether § 376 would survive such a challenge? And,
of considerable importance, what changes can and should be made
to ensure compliance with the Jenkins Act by remote Indian ciga-
rette vendors? The following subsections seek to resolve the first
of these important questions.
1. Foundational Principles
Almost two centuries of federal Indian law has been shaped by
the recognition of Indian tribes as indigenous nations that enjoy
an "inherent sovereignty"22' over their land and people.222 The no-
tion that Indian tribes are sovereign entities was first explicated
by Chief Justice John Marshall in the seminal case, Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia,223 where the Court recognized Indian tribes as
"domestic, dependent nations" that were "capable of managing
[their] own affairs and governing [themselves]."224 According to
one scholar, the concept of Indian tribal sovereignty encompasses
a variety of social, cultural, and political aspects, including:
221. DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
THE MASKING OF JUSTICE, 20-21 (1997). See also COHEN, supra note 6, at 123 (commenting
that "John Marshall's analysis of the basis of Indian self-government in the law of nations
has been consistently followed by the courts for more than a hundred years").
222. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991).
223. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Long before the advent of the Supreme Court tribes had
been treated as "distinct, independent, political communities." Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). Through treaty making the French, British and confederate
states recognized the sovereign status of Indian tribes, and although the treaties were often
entered into for self-serving reasons, there still existed a recognition by European and
colonial officials that Indian nations were naturally endowed with the right of self-
government and control over their land and citizens. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant
Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1064-98 (1995) (discussing colonial man-
agement of Indian affairs). See also Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The Evo-
lution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 99, 103-04 (1998) (discussing the histori-
cal and contemporary development of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity).
When the colonists came to America in the 1600s and the 1700s, they treated the na-
tive tribes as separate nations. The young republic entered into numerous treaties -
documents generally reserved for international relations - with the tribes. Many of
these were alliances created to bolster the colonies' strength in the fight against the
English.
Id.
224. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
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[T]he power to adopt its own form of government; to define
the conditions of citizenship/membership in the nation; to
regulate the domestic relations of the nation's citi-
zens/members . . . to levy dues, fees, or taxes upon citi-
zens/members and noncitizen/nonmembers . . . to administer
justice . . . and to prescribe the duties and regulate the con-
duct of... employees.225
Ideally, this view bespeaks of an absolute power of Indian tribes
to self-govern absent the involvement or interference from the
state or federal governments. Of course, no nation is truly sover-
eign - interdependencies exist for the acquisition of raw materials
and protection from belligerent states, among other reasons. This
is even truer with respect to Indian nations, whose sovereignty is
qualified by the overriding power of the United States. 26 The rec-
ognition of inherent sovereignty, therefore, was immediately
qualified by Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation as being quasi-
sovereign through his use of the term "dependent nations."
The Court's delineation of tribal sovereignty as being subject to
the higher power of the federal government is an anomaly. The
very concept of sovereignty suggests that a government maintains
the ability to govern freely without unsolicited interference from
compeer bodies. Therefore, the notion that the sovereign status of
Indian tribes, which are extra-constitutional entities, as being
subject to the dictates of a superior constitutional entity is curi-
ous, particularly since the constitutional compact dictates that the
sovereignty of the federal government is drawn from the individ-
ual states of which it is comprised.227 Over time the notion of a
"quasi-sovereign" status for Indian tribes has developed in re-
sponse to congressional228 and judicial
229 prerogatives. 230
225. WILKINS, supra note 221, at 20.
226. "Congress has plenary power to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-
government which the tribes otherwise possess." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 56 (1978).
227. COHEN, supra note 6, at 89.
228. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the
tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress since the beginning."). See
also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary for their protection, as well as to
the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in the government, because
it has never existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and be-
cause it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
Id. at 384-85.
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The source of federal involvement in relation to Indian self-
government and interaction with states derives from Article I, § 8
of the Constitution, 3' which grants Congress the power "[t]o regu-
late Commerce... with the Indian tribes."232 Despite this ostensi-
bly static interrelationship between the legislative branch and
Indian tribes, the Supreme Court has been responsible for defin-
ing the actual scope of Congress' power over Indian tribes, which
is often described as plenary.233 The Court's decisions in this area
have largely been for pragmatic reasons: At the time such cases as
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia" were decided, the federal govern-
ment was actively engaged in treaty making with Indian tribes for
the purposes of land acquisition and to protect tribes from state
hegemony.2 35 The formulation of a quasi-sovereign status for In-
229. The United States Supreme Court, in Oliphant v. Susquamish Indian Tribe, stated:
In 1891, this Court recognized that Congress' various actions and inactions in regu-
lating criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations demonstrated an intent to reserve
jurisdiction over non-Indians for the federal courts. In In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107,
115-116, 11 S. Ct. 939, 941, 35 L. Ed. 635 (1891), the Court noted that the policy of
Congress had been to allow the inhabitants of Indian country "such power of self-
government as was thought to be consistent with the safety of the white population
with which they may have come in contact, and to encourage them as far as possible
in raising themselves to our standard of civilization." The "general object" of the con-
gressional statutes was to allow Indian nations criminal "jurisdiction of all controver-
sies between Indians, or where a member of the nation is the only party to the pro-
ceeding, and to reserve to the courts of the United States jurisdiction of all actions to
which its own citizens are parties on either side." Ibid. While Congress never ex-
pressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now
make express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consis-
tently believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.
Oliphant v. Susquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 204 (1978).
230. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1586 (1996) (discussing the pre-
dominant role non-Indian interests have played in recent Supreme Court decisions concern-
ing Indian/state jurisdictional disputes).
231. COHEN, supra note 6, at 89.
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
233. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limita-
tions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1984) (discussing the historical development of congres-
sional power over Indians, judicially formulated limitations on such power, and factors
influencing the application of such limitations). In Indian law, plenary power has been
used in the context of congressional exclusivity to manage Indian affairs, the power for
Congress to preempt state laws, and unlimited congressional power, which can be further
delineated into two subgroups concerning congressional power over Indian affairs that is
not limited by other Constitutional provisions and unlimited powers with regard to con-
gressional prerogatives. Id. at 196 n.3.
234. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 1.
235. Newton, supra note 233, at 200. Spanning from 1789-1871, the era of treaty-
making between the tribes and the federal government reflected the federal treatment of
Indian tribes as sovereign nations. COHEN, supra note 6, at 91 ("Beginning with an Indian
treaty submitted to the Senate by President Washington on May 25, 1789, the President
and Senate entered into some treaty relations with nearly every tribe and band within the
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dian tribes during this era was principled on the intent of the
Court to prevent states from asserting dominion over tribal lands
thus setting off violent conflicts.23 s If states were permitted to uni-
laterally interfere with the already delicate relationships between
the federal government and tribes, the prevailing goal of forging a
unified national body would have been greatly frustrated.
In Worcester v. Georgia, the third case in Justice Marshall's
trilogy of landmark decisions concerning Indian sovereignty,23 s the
Court overturned Georgia's conviction of a non-Indian living on
Cherokee lands for his failure to receive permission from the state
to do so on the grounds that Georgia had unconstitutionally inter-
fered with federal control over Indian affairs by essentially pro-
jecting its laws onto Indian territory 9  While asserting the exclu-
sive federal power to manage Indian affairs, Justice Marshall si-
multaneously affirmed the sovereign status of Indian nations with
respect to state laws.24° He explained that "[the laws of Georgia]
interfere forcibly with the relations established between the
United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which,
territorial limits of the United States."). Concurrent with treaty-making by the federal
government was the passage of legislation, such as the Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790,
that were designed to "effectuate treaty promises" by creating punitive measures that
would serve to punish individuals or states that violated existing treaties or otherwise
encroached on Indian lands. Newton, supra note 233, at 201.
236. See Newton, supra note 233, at 201.
237. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
238. The first case was Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), in which
Justice Marshall affirmed the federal preeminence and control to purchase or confiscate
Indian lands by stating:
It has never been doubted, that either the United States, or the several States, had a
clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty [between
Great Britain and the United States that concluded the Revolutionary War], subject
only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that exclusive power to extinguish that
right, was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it.
Id. at 584-85.
Justice Marshall explained that the federal power to assert control over all territo-
ries within the United States was preeminent, but tempered this by saying that the federal
government must affirmatively exercise such power before title to Indian lands could be
conveyed. Newton, supra note 233, at 208. Thus, Indians not only remained the rightful
occupants over their territories, but also retained absolute sovereignty within the borders
of their lands until the federal government exercised its powers. Id.
239. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
240. "The Cherokee nation.., is a distinct community occupying its own territory ... in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves . . .and with the acts of
Congress." Id.
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according to settled principles of our constitution, are committed
exclusively to the government of the union."
241
Justice Marshall's reasoned defense of federal ascendancy, con-
gressional to be precise, over state power with respect to interac-
tion with Indian tribes, was derived from the powers granted to
Congress in the Constitution.242 In Worcester v. Georgia,"3 for ex-
ample, particular emphasis was placed on the analogy between
Indian affairs and the congressional power to manage foreign af-
fairs;2" however, the obvious distinction that Indian nations were
in fact domestic and not "foreign" per se was ostensibly lost on all
but Indian tribes.245  In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 6 the Court
explained that Indian nations were not foreign in a constitutional
sense, but rather "dependent nations" that were in a state of "pu-
pilage" to the federal government. More pointedly, "[t]heir rela-
tions to the United States resembles that of ward to his guard-
ian."24 17 Sovereignty of the Indian tribes was consequently defined
241. Id. Marshall's view of federal supremacy was largely derived from prior interaction
between the Indians and the European powers. As he made clear in Worcester, "[t]he gen-
eral law of European sovereigns, respecting their claims in America, limited the intercourse
of Indians, in a great degree, to the particular potentate whose ultimate right of dominion
was acknowledged by the others." Id. at 551-52. Where the British Crown was previously
recognized as the preeminent foreign sovereign in North America, the Indians primarily
limited the occurrence of trade and treaty-making to that nation. According to Justice
Marshall, "the strong hand of government was interposed to restrain the disorderly and
licentious [subordinate sovereigns] from intru[ding] into their country, from encroachments
on their lands, and from those acts of violence which were often attended by reciprocal
murder .... [Through this arrangement, the Indians became] bound . . . to the British
crown, as ... dependent all[ies], claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neighbor,
and receiving advantages of that protection." Id. at 552.
242. Newton, supra note 233, at 202. "[O]ur existing constitution .... [C]onfers on
congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes. These powers com-
prehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians." Worces-
ter, 31 U.S (6 Pet.) at 559.
243. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
244. See Newton, supra note 233, at 202-03. Congressional power to abrogate foreign
treaties by enacting conflicting legislation was employed early with Indian treaties. Id. at
202. Additionally, the political question doctrine, which is often invoked by the judicial
branch in deference to congressional decision-making in foreign affairs matters, was fre-
quently used by the courts as a justification for not questioning congressional authority in
Indian affairs cases. Id. at 203.
245. It is an absurd notion that the Court and federal government truly believed an apt
analogy could be drawn between foreign nations and domestic Indian tribes. Because a
foreign nation would generally not be forcibly removed from occupied lands on the basis of a
treaty with a separate sovereign, the removalist policies of Congress, particularly with
regard to thousands of members of the Cherokee nation, were treated as invalid by the
Indians. See I FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 236-42 (1984) (discussing the
forced removal of the Cherokee nations from their southern lands).
246. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1832).
247. Id. at 17.
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as being entirely subordinate to the prerogatives of Congress.
The paternalistic characterization of the relationship between
Congress and the tribes that marked the early years of jurispru-
dential involvement in Indian affairs did not, of course, continued
unabated.249
2. Modes of Analysis
The Court's early decisions regarding tribal sovereignty were
marked with territorial deference to Indian lands,25° often to the
detriment of the states that sought to assert their authority. Over
time, as more non-Indians moved onto Indian lands and interacted
with Indian tribes,251 the Court's method of reasoning gradually
gave way to an analysis based on the status of the parties sub-
jected to state law.2"2 Many tribes had assented to the encroach-
248. Newton, supra note 233, at 205.
249. See Kneeland, supra note 193, at 887 n.34 (commenting that even during the
treaty-making era, "tribes were relocated from states east of the Mississippi river to more
remote lands in the western states in an attempt to segregate tribes from interaction with
non-Indians .... Once tribes were settled in the West, missionaries attempted to 'civilize'
the tribes and their members."). It has also been explained by Nell Jessup Newton that
Justice Marshall's language in Johnson v. M'Intosh spawned a host of judicial misinterpre-
tations concerning the ownership interest of the federal government in Indian lands, in-
cluding the repudiation of the Indian right of ownership in their lands and the subjugation
of Indians to the political power of the United States. Newton, supra note 233, at 210.
250. Melissa A. Rosenthal, Comment, Where There Is Smoke There Is Fire: New York's
Battle to Collect Taxes on Cigarette Sales Made By Indian Retailers To Non-Indians: Mil-
helm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. Department of Taxation and Finance of The State of New York,
615 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. (1993) (No. 93-377), 17 HAMLINE L.
REV. 507, 513-14 (discussing, in the context of the then-undecided Milhelm Attea & Bros.
case, past Supreme Court decisions wherein the assertion of state authority over Indian
reservations was abrogated on the basis of geographical limitations).
251. For example, in United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), the Court rejected
the application of 18 U.S.C § 1152, which provides that "'the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place... of the United States...
shall extend to Indian Country'", to the murder of one white by another on the Ute Reser-
vation in Colorado on the grounds that the State of Colorado had, by treaty, "acquired
criminal jurisdiction over its citizens... throughout the whole of the territory... including
the Ute Reservation." Id. at 622, 624. The federal statute by its language covered the
crime at issue, but the Court held that the federal government did not have jurisdiction to
enact the law because the state had not conceded jurisdiction in its enabling act. Id. By
concluding that it was Colorado which maintained criminal jurisdiction over murders of a
white man by another on tribal lands and not the federal district court, the Court's decision
implicitly abrogated the territorial sovereignty of Indian tribes and expressly abrogated the
territorial sovereignty of the federal government.
252. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 275 (1898) (holding that the State of Oklahoma
could levy a tax on cattle owned by non-Indians that were grazing on Indian for the reasons
that "such a tax is too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax or burden on interstate com-
merce, so it is too remote and indirect to be regarded as an interference with the legislative
power of congress").
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ment by states onto reservations in the areas of criminal and civil
jurisdiction primarily because of the reservation system and the
large number of non-Indians occupying and surrounding tribal
lands.253 Given congressional preeminence over state authority in
the realm of Indian affairs, the Court's analysis of state regulation
affecting Indian tribes involved a determination of whether Con-
gress had so comprehensively regulated the matter such that state
action was preempted,254 or whether state action was preempted
on the basis of conflict with federal policies or purposes."'
In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,"6 Justice Thurgood
Marshall identified the Court's approach in resolving tribal/state
jurisdiction disputes predominantly to be "reliance on federal pre-
emption."257 While this form of analysis served to protect the con-
gressional/tribal interrelationship from state interference, it was
to be conducted on a case-by-case basis thus leaving open the pos-
sibility that a state could regulate the conduct of non-Indians oc-
curring on tribal lands.25 s Indeed, in McClanahan, the Court ex-
plicitly rejected Arizona's attempt to tax the income of a Navajo
earned from reservation sources for the reason that Indian affairs
fell exclusively under the purview of Congress.255
Justice Marshall's exposition on the appropriateness of state
regulation regarding the actions of non-Indians on Indian lands
253. Getches, supra note 230, at 1589. Professor Getches posits that the reduction of
tribal leaders as the result of U.S. involvement in World War II coupled with non-Indian
encroachment on reservations weakened the resistance of tribes to greater assertions of
state jurisdiction. Id.
254. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 688 (1965) (holding
invalid a state gross income tax imposed on the sale proceeds of the Warren Trading Post
Company that was engaged in trade with the Navajo Indians on the grounds that the
"comprehensive federal regulation[s]" embodied in the Indian Trader Statutes preempted
state taxation of the proceeds obtained through Indian sales).
255. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). The Court
held invalid the state's attempt to tax the income of a Navajo Indians that was derived
entirely from reservation sources on the grounds that the Indian sovereignty doctrine "pro-
vides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."
Id. Such federal enactments "define the limits of state power," even if they do not directly
speak to the state action at issue. Id.
256. 411U.S. 164 (1973).
257. Id. at 173.
258. See COHEN, supra note 6, at 121.
259. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 175-76. The State of Arizona argued that the right of
tribal self-government and the taxation of an individual's income should be viewed as mu-
tually exclusive. Pursuant to Williams v. Lee, Arizona argued that the determinant of valid
state action was whether it infringed upon the right of an Indian tribe to make their own
laws and be ruled by them. Id. Thus, a tax on individual does not infringe upon a tribe's
right of self-government. The Court rejected this argument for the reason that the Wil-
liams v. Lee test applies to situations involving non-Indians. Id.
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was taken from the Court's prior decision in Williams v. Lee,26°
where it was established that the test for determining the validity
of state action is whether it infringes upon the right of self-
government26' of the tribe.262 While the infringement test has
never been formally disregarded, the Court previously determined
the preemption analysis to be the dominant test in state/tribal
disputes involving non-Indians.26  Accordingly, in the absence of
preemption by a federal statute or policy, state regulations can be
defeated on the basis of infringing upon tribal sovereignty.2 4
Though the two analyses are independent, the Court has clarified
that:
[t]hey are related, however, in two important ways. The right
of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and sub-
ject to the broad power of Congress. Even so, traditional no-
tions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our
jurisprudence that they have provided an important "back-
drop" against which vague or ambiguous enactments must
always be measured.265
To avoid the possible constraints of a solitary analysis, the
Court has therefore reserved an alternative means of invalidating
state (or federal) regulations that, although drafted carefully
260. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
261. The right of tribal self-government has been interpreted to mean the right of a tribe
to determine the form of government, the power to determine tribal membership, tribal
regulation over domestic relations between Indians, the right to control the distribution of
tribal land to decedents, the power to determine that taxation of its members and non-
members engaged in activities on tribal land, the power over tribal property, and the ad-
ministration of intra-tribal justice. COHEN, supra note 6, at 122-49. McClanahan explicitly
rejected this as the only test for determining whether state laws are forbidden from being
applied in Indian country and instead employed an analysis of whether the state law was
categorically preempted by congressional involvement in tribal affairs. McClanahan, 411
U.S. at 176.
262. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that the Arizona court sys-
tem did not have jurisdiction over disputes arising from on-reservation activities because
the exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with the authority of tribal court to adjudicate
internal Indian matters).
263. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427-29 (1973) (holding that a state
court could not assert jurisdiction over an on-reservation dispute because it failed to adhere
to the requirements of Public Law 280, a federal statute, when it could have alternatively
held, based upon Williams v. Lee, that jurisdiction by the state would have infringed upon
the sovereignty of the tribe).
264. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). Although the
analysis was somewhat less coherent, the Court employed a balancing test in Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) decided the
previous term.
265. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143 (internal citation omitted).
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enough to avoid being preempted by federal law or policy, might
still frustrate the fundamental tenets of tribal sovereignty.
Further complicating the analysis was White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker,266 where, in holding that Arizona's attempt to tax
non-Indians engaged in logging activities on the Navajo Reserva-
tion was invalid, the Court also sought to balance "the state, fed-
eral, and tribal interests at stake"267 in determining the validity of
state regulations affecting Indian commerce. The Court concluded
that due to the comprehensive regulations Congress had enacted
concerning the harvesting and sale of timber, and where the state
could demonstrate only a general desire to raise revenues, the
balance of state, federal, and tribal interests leaned heavily in fa-
vor of the latter two for the reason that the state's tax burden
would threaten the overriding federal objective of "guaranteeing
Indians" the profits derived from the reservation timber sales.268
The federal/tribal interest did not prevail in all cases though. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a clear willingness to
permit the imposition of state taxes on non-Indians purchasing
goods on tribal lands, particularly in the area of cigarette sales.269
266. Id.
267. Id. at 145. Professor Getches argues that the balancing test employed by the Court
in White Mountain Apache Tribe and its progeny are in fact a fabrication tracing back to
the Court's decision in McClanahan. In that case, Justice Marshall, in discussing the
jurisprudential evolution of tribal sovereignty, indicated that state authority on tribal lands
would be permissible to the extent necessary "to take account of the State's legitimate
interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians.'" Getches, supra note 230, at 1626 (quot-
ing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973)). He observes that
Justice Marshall advocated the consideration of state interests in Indian matters affecting
non-Indians, but he did not state that a balancing of the state/tribal/federal interests
should occur in cases involving only Indians and their property. Id. at 1627. With regard
to the Court's invocation of the "balancing" test in White Mountain Apache Tribe, Professor
Getches posits that Justice Marshall intentionally blurred his statement regarding the
"account[ing] of... State ... interests" and replaced it with the more general "particular-
ized inquiry into the nature of state, federal, and tribal interests at stake" as a means win-
ning over other Justices who may have wanted more leeway in deciding the case. Id. at
1627-28.
268. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 48 U.S. at 149. The Court's use of the adverb "only"
implies that if, in addition to raising revenues, a state could also demonstrate a need, for
example, to protect the health and well-being of its citizens, then that might be dispositive
in favoring the interests of a state.
269. CANBY, supra note 12, at 212.
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V. SOVEREIGNTY AND CIGARETTES
A. Moe
In 1976, the Court rendered judgment in the first of what would
become several challenges to a state's application of excise taxes
on cigarette sales made by Indians to non-Indians. In Moe v. Con-
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,2"' the Court considered the
challenge of the Salish and Kootenai Indians against Montana's
attempts to: (1) assess personal property taxes upon motor vehi-
cles owned by tribal members living on reservation lands, and (2)
collect taxes on cigarette sales made to tribal members and non-
Indians on their reservation.271
With regard to the former, the state appealed from a district
court ruling prohibiting the state from assessing personal property
taxes against reservation Indians. 272 The Court's rationale in de-
ciding this issue clearly evidences primacy of the categorical pre-
emption analysis. Based entirely on its previous decision in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,272 Justice Rehnquist,
in writing for a unanimous Court, held that since the tribe was
under the control and protection of Congress, and that the reser-
vation lands were not under the jurisdiction of the State, then
Montana had no power to impose personal property taxes on resi-
dent Indians.274 Emphasizing the exclusive role of Congress in
regulating the extent of state taxing jurisdiction over Indian prop-
erty, Justice Rehnquist noted that, in seeking to avoid a "checker-
board approach" to permitting "state law [to reach] within reser-
vation lands," 75 there existed no express congressional permission
for Montana to impose personal property taxes upon Indians. As a
corollary, the Court also referenced briefly a finding of the district
court that the "Tribe's own income contributed significantly to its
economic wellbeing."2 6 By permitting Montana to levy taxes upon
the property of tribal members, the overarching congressional goal
270. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
271. Id. at 465.
272. Id. at 466.
273. 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding that the Arizona's power to tax the income of tribal
members was preempted by longstanding federal policies reserving such a power exclu-
sively to Congress).
274. Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-76.
275. Id. at 479.
276. Id. at 476.
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of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development
would have been seriously undermined.
The second, and most pivotal, issue considered regarding Mon-
tana's taxation of on-reservation cigarette sales engendered a pre-
scient assessment of the current climate in excise tax collection.
In the outset of his opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated:
[The Tribe] urges that the State cannot impose its cigarette
tax on sales by Indians to non-Indians because "[i]n simple
terms, [the Indian retailer] has been taxed, and .. . has suf-
fered a measurable out-of-pocket loss." But this claim . . . ig-
nores the finding that "it is the non-Indian consumer or user
that saves the tax and reaps the benefit of the tax exemption."
[T]he Montana statute . . . provides that the cigarette tax
"shall be conclusively presumed to be [a] direct [tax] on the re-
tail consumer precollected for the purpose of convenience and
facility only." Since nonpayment of the tax is a misdemeanor
as to the retail purchaser, the competitive advantage which
the Indian seller doing business on tribal land enjoys over all
other cigarette retailers, within and without the reservation,
is dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser
is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax. Without
the simple expedient of having the retailer collect the sales
tax from non-Indian purchasers, it is clear that wholesale vio-
lations of the law by the latter class will go virtually un-
checked.277
The Court recognized that the tribe's challenge against the im-
position of state excise collection tax responsibilities was nothing
more than a thinly-veiled attempt at retaining a competitive ad-
vantage over all other merchants who are legally required to col-
lect the excise tax from those individuals that can be assessed the
tax. 25' The Court concluded that the legal and economic inci-
dences of the cigarette taxes were upon the non-Indian customers,
notwithstanding the fact that the Indian retailer was required to
pre-collect the taxes prior to sale.279
277. Id. at 481-82.
278. The Court dismissed the tribe's assertion that "to make the Indian retailer an 'in-
voluntary agent' for collection of taxes owed by non-Indians is a 'gross interference with
[its] freedom from state regulation.'" Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
279. See id. at 482.
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The collection requirements imposed upon the Indians did not
amount to actual taxation of tribal members and thus were not to
be treated as part of the "special area of taxation" requiring ex-
plicit congressional approval.28 In addition, Montana's tax collec-
tion requirements were found not to have "run afoul of any con-
gressional enactment,"28 ' negating the argument that they were
preempted either expressly by a federal statute, or implicitly by
abrogating Congress' dominant objective of encouraging tribal
self-sufficiency. Pre-collection was consequently deemed by the
Court to be a minimal burden on the Indian merchants that posed
no interference with the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.282 Given
that the tax was a lawful one, and was being assessed on those
who were legally subject to laws of the state notwithstanding their
presence on reservation lands at the time of purchase, the state's
economic interests in collecting the tax outweighed the economic
interests of the tribe in maintaining a competitive sales advan-
tage.
283
The Moe Court addressed important aspects of cigarette excise
taxation in the context of Indian sovereignty. Principally, the
geographical boundaries of the reservation were not dispositive for
the protection of non-Indians from state taxation, and that tribal
self-government did not automatically shield Indian cigarette
merchants from the laws of a state. Although Moe may be viewed
as a blow to Indian sovereignty, such a contention is true only on a
superficial level. The obligation of an Indian vendor to assist in
the collection of state sales and excise taxes technically constitutes
a projection of state law onto tribal lands, but it does not interfere
with the right of a tribe to impose additional sales or excise taxes
on cigarette purchases, 28 nor does it violate the heretofore recog-
nized immunity from state taxation enjoyed by Indians engaged in
285commerce in Indian country.
280. Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 482-83.
283. Id. at 483.
284. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 152 (1980).
285. See COHEN, supra note 6, at 116. Although individual Indians were required to
assist in the collection of taxes, as noted by the Court, the taxes could not be assessed on
Indian customers. Moe, 425 U.S. at 480. As a practical matter, the imposition of state
taxes on sales to non-Indians from tribal lands may potentially result in the Indian vendor
being placed at a competitive sales disadvantage. This would occur if the state is unwilling
to offer a credit to non-Indians for purchases made in Indian country and the Indian mer-
chant is left selling a product with higher taxes than comparable products sold outside of
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Moe was significant in that the Court imposed clear limitations
on the protections afforded by tribal sovereignty, but one impor-
tant issue that was left unaddressed was possible enforcement
mechanisms available to the state in the event the Indian retailers
failed to comply with the Court's ruling."6 Because the Court
never discussed the matter of remedies for Montana, it is possible
that the state either failed to consider the likelihood of future non-
compliance or that they declined to raise the issue for fear that
their entire argument would be dismissed as constituting an un-
due encroachment upon tribal sovereignty. In either event, the
issue of remedies was left for future Courts to decide.
B. Colville
Coming closely on the heels of Moe was Washington v. Confed-
erated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,"' where the Court
entertained a second challenge to a state's effort to tax cigarettes
sold from tribal lands to non-Indians.288 In Colville, the State of
Washington's cigarette taxing regulations were challenged by con-
federated Indian tribes - the Colville, Makah and Lummi - that
imposed their own reservation-based sales taxes on cigarettes.289
The tribes ostensibly challenged the regulations, which, similar to
the statute at issue in Moe, required Indian retailers to pre-collect
the excise tax by purchasing cigarette stamps,8  on the grounds
that the imposition of a state excise tax unconstitutionally inter-
fered with their right of self-government and was preempted by
Indian country. Such a result, however, is not absolute; states may be willing to offer cred-
its for sales made on tribal lands in order to maintain goodwill with the Indian tribe or
because the tribe has the bargaining power to persuade the state to do so.
286. Contrary to the opinion, the Court asserts that the matter of enforcement was ad-
dressed. "We therefore agree that with the District Court that to the extent that the
'smokeshops' sell to those upon whom the State has validly imposed a sales or excise tax
with respect to the article sold, the State may require the Indian proprietor simply to add
the tax to the sales price and thereby aid the State's collection and enforcement thereof."
Moe, 425 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added). It appears that the Court's use of the term "en-
forcement" was superfluous to the state's "collection," because nowhere in the opinion does
the Court discuss how Montana will be able to enforce the right to collect excise and sales
taxes.
287. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
288. Colville, 447 U.S. at 134.
289. Id. at 144. Although the State of Washington also sought to impose motor vehicle
excise taxes on vehicles owned by the tribe, privilege taxes, as well as a general sales tax on
other goods purchased by non-Indians, for the purposes of this Article the analysis will be
focused exclusively on the Indians' challenge to Washington's cigarette excise tax.
290. Id. at 141.
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tribal taxing ordinances.29' The trial court found in favor of the
tribes on the basis of a preemption analysis, and alternatively,
that the state taxes impermissibly impeded the tribes' rights to
self-government.292  Washington thereafter appealed the findings
that the application of the state cigarette excise taxes violated
tribal sovereignty and that the state could not impose record-
keeping requirements upon Indian retailers for sales to non-
Indians.293
At issue was the $1.60 per carton excise tax and five percent
sales tax that the state imposed upon all cigarette sales to non-
Indians, regardless of the situs of sale.294 Separately, each of the
confederated tribes collected a tax on cigarette sales from their
respective reservations which ranged from forty to fifty cents per
carton. Because Washington imposed higher tax rates, a majority
of the tribal cigarette sales were made to non-Indians who trav-
eled to the reservations to enjoy the price discounts. 295 As part of
its regulations, the state mandated that the Indian cigarette mer-
chants keep "detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in
addition to pre-collecting the tax."296 In an effort to staunch the
flow of illegally sold cigarettes and mitigate the likelihood of tax
evasion by non-Indians, the state also seized contraband ciga-
rettes being delivered to the Indian reservations.297
The tribal challenge to the application of the state cigarette
taxes, while sharing commonalities to Moe, differed in the impor-
tant regard that the challenge entailed direct involvement in the
cigarette business by the tribes through the taxation and sale of
tobacco products.29 Indian retailers were faced not only with the
prospect of losing their competitive edge with non-Indian vendors,
but also, there existed the strong likelihood of losing a consistent
source of tax revenue should the state prevail.299
291. Id. at 140.
292. See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F.
Supp. 1339, 1360-61 (E.D. Wash. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 135 (1980).
293. Colville, 447 U.S. at 139.
294. Id. at 141-42.
295. Id. at 145.
296. Id. at 151.
297. Id. at 139.
298. Id. at 151.
299. If the state were able to impose its cigarette excise tax and sales tax, the Indian
vendors would essentially be forced to repeal their cigarette tax otherwise the cost of ciga-
rettes on the tribal reservations would exceed the cost of purchasing cigarettes off reserva-
tion. Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
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At the outset of the Court's opinion, Justice White indicated
that the tribes retain an inherent power to impose taxes on trans-
actions occurring on reservation lands by virtue of tribal sover-
eignty. °0 In acknowledging that the right of tribal taxation could
be abrogated in the event of conflict "with the overriding interests
of the National Government,"" ' the Court dismissed the categori-
cal preemption argument for the reason that no "overriding fed-
eral interest" existed that would proscribe the rights of the tribes
to impose their own cigarette taxes.0 2 The tribes, however, took
the argument one step further and contended that not only were
Washington's tax regulations inconsistent with their rights of
tribal sovereignty to impose their own taxes, but also that they
were preempted by federal regulation that seeks to "foster . . .
tribal self-government and economic development." 3
The Court rejected these arguments and reaffirmed its reason-
ing in Moe by stating that several principles should be accounted
for before the parties' various interests are weighed, including the
right of a state to impose "minimal" burdens on an Indian retailer
to assist in the collection of a legitimate and non-discriminatory
state tax on non-Indian customers. Additionally, the Court indi-
cated that there exists no obstacles to a state mandating record-
keeping and reporting requirements on an Indian retailer, and,
most significantly, that a state tax may still be valid even if it "se-
riously disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's business
with non-Indians. "3°4
In balancing the state and tribal interests, Justice White noted
it was "painfully apparent" that the tribes were not marketing
value generated from their reservations, but rather, the only thing
the Indian vendors are able to market is a tax exemption for non-
Indian customers.0 ' The "principles of federal Indian law,
whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or
300. Id. at 152.
301. Id. at 153.
302. Id. at 154.
303. Id. at 155. Of the federal statutes cited by the tribes as being preemptive of the
state taxing regulations were the Indian Reorganization Act of 1034, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.,
the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq., and the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. Id. at 155.
With regard to federal preemption, the Court concluded that regardless of the federal gov-
ernment's implicit approval of their tribal taxing regulations, Congress did not intend to
preempt valid state cigarette taxes in doing so. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
304. Id. at 151. "Moe makes clear that the Tribes have no vested right to a certain vol-
ume of sales to non-Indians, or indeed to any such sales at all." Id. at n.27.
305. Id. at 155.
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otherwise, [do not] authorize Indian tribes thus to market an ex-
emption from state taxation to persons who would normally do
their business elsewhere." °6 The potential revenue losses for the
tribes was not lost on the Court, but it nonetheless concluded that
the tribes did not prove to a compelling degree that the imposition
of state taxes, or the failure of the state to grant a credit to con-
sumers, would reduce tribal business to the point of elimination."7
The Court assumed that even if a credit was granted by the state
to customers, then it would be irrelevant to individual Indians
who are immune from state taxation and would still be inclined to
frequent the more conveniently located reservation-based retail-
ers, as well as to non-Indians whose patronage would not increase
as the result of a credit.0 8 It was therefore unlikely that business
would ever be fully eliminated for the Indian tribes.
Pursuant to the tribes' challenge to the record-keeping require-
ments imposed by the state, the Court concluded that since the
application of the excise and sales taxes were upheld, then man-
dating that Indian merchants record the number and dollar vol-
ume of sales to non-Indians was entirely permissible.3 9 Having
reached that conclusion, it was then incumbent upon the tribes to
demonstrate how the record-keeping requirements were not a
"reasonably necessary means of preventing fraudulent transac-
tions," a burden they failed to sustain.310
Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the result,31 ' affirmed the
state's right to impose cigarette and sales taxes on non-Indian cus-
tomers absent consideration of the state and tribal interests that
the majority sought to balance."2 Instead, the dispositive mode of
analysis for the Court should have been the more straightforward
306. Id.
307. Id. at 158.
308. Colville, 447 U.S. at 158. Patronage by non-Indians would not increase as the re-
sult of a state tax credit because such consumers would be forced to pay the higher of the
state or tribal taxes. For a state/tribal tax credit arrangement to be economically advanta-
geous to a tribe, the tribe will impose a lower tax rate than the state. Ideally, this should
encourage non-Indians to patronize tribal vendors because lower taxes will be assessed on
their purchases. However, this assumption is flawed. In a credit arrangement, the state
will be able to impose the full amount of its tax, only that a certain amount (equivalent to
the tribal tax(es)) will be retained by the tribe. Thus, the non-Indian consumer will still
pay the higher of the two taxes, just that a portion will go to the tribe. From a standpoint
of convenience there is no reason for a non-Indian to travel to tribal lands to purchase ciga-
rettes when they could do so closer to home for an equivalent price.
309. Id. at 159.
310. Id. at 160.
311. Id. at 176.
312. Id. at 177.
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determination of whether Congress intended to preempt the
state's application of its taxes and record-keeping requirements.3
Relying heavily on the Court's decision in McClanahan, Justice
Rehnquist looked not only to existing federal statutes, but also,
more importantly, to the Court's earlier decisions regarding tribal
sovereignty that would provide the "backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and statutes must be read.""4 Of note was his
observation that "[w]hen tradition did not recognize a sovereign
immunity in favor of the Indians, this Court would recognize one
only if Congress expressly conferred one."" 5 Finding no express
congressional prohibition against the taxing of on-reservation ac-
tivities,"6 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Court's prior deci-
sions, including Moe, affirmed the "imposition of a state tax on its
non-Indian . . .purchases,""7 thus "resolv[ing] the validity of the
cigarette tax levied by the State"
318
Colville had the important effect of complementing the conclu-
sions previously reached in Moe, but again left unresolved (and
unaddressed) was the question of whether there are remedies
available to a state to enforce the valuable rights conferred by the
Court's holdings.
C. Sovereignty Revisited
The term "sovereignty" has historically been invoked in the con-
text of legal disputes 39 between states and Indians and may be
perceived as limited to being a territorial, either political or geo-
graphical, distinction for the applicability of state power. How-
ever, a more sophisticated view of the concept of tribal sovereignty
entails not only a recognition of the cultural and communal as-
pects of tribal existence, encompassed within the term "self-
determination,"3 20 but moreover, includes self-reliance in the form
of the creation and preservation of individual Indian and tribal
321businesses.
313. Id.
314. Colville, 447 U.S. at 178.
315. Id. at 179.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 180.
318. Id. at 181.
319. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 26 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
320. Id. at 27.
321. See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1278 (1995) (analyzing the Indian
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The Court's decision in Colville has been viewed as undercutting
the sovereignty of Indian tribes because the result may potentially
reduce economic self-sufficiency and, accordingly, the financial
independence of individual Indians and tribes.2 Justice Brennan
articulated this idea in a dissent to the Court's balancing preemp-
tion test.3 23  He advocated the use of a more subtle preemption
analysis. That is, rather than just looking to whether Congress
Self-Determination Act of 1994 in the framework of the historically paternalistic relation-
ship between the federal government and Indian tribes).
322. The Court recognized that the imposition of state cigarette and sales taxes on sales
to non-Indians would reduce the competitive advantage of Indian smokeshops, yet, as pre-
viously noted, this possibility was of little import to the Court, which felt that the market-
ing of a tax exemption did not reflect one of the traditional rights to tribal self-government.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. As stated by Justice White, "[wihile the Tribes do have an inter-
est in raising revenues for essential governmental programs, that interest is strongest
when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involv-
ing the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services." Id. at 154.
The term "value" as used by the Court can be interpreted to mean a traditional
function or good produced by the tribe. This implies that had the tribes been engaged in
selling, for example, cultural crafts then perhaps their interest in raising revenues would
be stronger than where they are simply retailing cigarettes produced off tribal lands. On a
superficial level, this theory comports with other decisions of the Court. See White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (prohibiting the state of Arizona from
imposing motor carrier license and use fuel taxes on vehicles involved in tribal timber op-
erations); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding that the
state could assess a use tax on goods acquired out-of-state for the construction of chair lifts
as part of a tribal-operated ski resort). The distinction between these two cases is that the
former commercial activity involved timber operations, which could arguably be considered
a traditional use of tribal lands, while the latter involved a ski resort, a non-traditional
commercial use of tribal lands.
However, to attempt to draw an analogy between cigarette sales and cultural crafts
and other products that are not regulated by the state or federal government may be inap-
propriate. Cigarettes are a heavily regulated product subject to a special excise tax in
addition to a sales tax. Depending, of course, on the nature of the good produced and sold
from the reservation (e.g., alcohol versus hand-woven blankets) then in all likelihood the
only state tax that a similar item sold from non-tribal lands would be subject to would be
the sales tax. Therein lies the crucial distinction: cigarettes are used habitually by most
consumers of the product and therefore stand to generate a great deal of money for the
relevant tax jurisdiction(s), while a traditional Indian-made product would be subject only
to the state sales tax and would, in most circumstances, be purchased relatively infre-
quently by non-Indian consumers. The Court's language ostensibly distinguishes Indian
generated goods versus non-Indian goods when, in reality, the real issue is lost revenue for
the state. Although there exists no empirical evidence to support such a contention, the
majority opinion would have likely come out the same way had the tribe been exclusively
marketing cigarettes produced on the reservation, notwithstanding the fact that the reve-
nues from such sales would have "derived from value generated on the reservation."
323. Colville, 447 U.S. at 165. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall. Id. at 164. Justice Marshall's joining of the dissent does not come as a complete
surprise given the exhaustive preemption analysis he conducted in McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173-79
(1972). In that case, Justice Marshall also took the time to recount the forced migration
policies of the federal government upon the Navajo peoples as one rationale for their im-
munity from state tax regulations. Id. at 175.
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has categorically proscribed state tax and reporting regulations,
ask whether the regulations frustrate federal objectives in helping
Indian tribes escape from "a century of oppression and paternal-
ism."324 After factoring the potentially adverse economic conse-
quences tribes would suffer from the loss of non-Indian customers
when the state taxes are imposed in addition to the tribal taxes, as
well as the Court's related conclusion that Indians possess no ab-
solute right to market tax-exemptions, Justice Brennan denigrates
the majority for fostering the erosion of tribal sovereignty.32 The
upshot of the Court's decision, he lamented, was that a state may
enact cigarette taxes without "risking any attendant loss of busi-
ness for its retailers while the Tribes must court economic harms
when they enact taxes of their own."326
Illustrative of the congressional goal of fostering economic de-
velopment and self-sufficiency was the enactment of such legisla-
tion as the Indian Reorganization Act that was designed "to reha-
bilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to de-
velop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and pa-
ternalism."327 As explained by Representative Edgar Howard (D-
Neb.), the legislation was intended to foster a "[p]rogram of self-
support and of business and civic experience in the management
of their own affairs,328 and would place the control over Indian
property and affairs "in the hands either of an Indian council or..
. a corporation to be organized by the Indians."329 The revitaliza-
tion of tribal reservations through economic development would
also potentially "generate substantial revenues for the education
and the social and economic welfare of its people[s]. '3  However,
notwithstanding the Court's favorable treatment of such legisla-
tion as the Indian Reorganization Act, the Moe and Colville deci-
sions have established that the goal of tribal independence
through economic self-sufficiency cannot be invoked capriciously;
indeed, when the consequence will be the abrogation of valid state
taxing regulations, Indians need to demonstrate more than just
324. Colville, 447 U.S. at 170 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones 411 U.S. 145,
152 (1972)).
325. Id. at 172.
326. Id.
327. H.R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong. (1934).
328. 78 CONG. REc. 11732 (1934).
329. Id. at 11125.
330. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1972).
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potential revenue losses to the tribe and its businesses.33 ' The
Court elucidated upon this precept in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe,332 which is often considered its
most controversial decision to date with regard to the taxation of
non-Indian cigarette sales on tribal lands.333
D. Potawatomi
The Potawatomi Indian Tribe challenged a $2.7 million excise
and sales tax assessment made by the Oklahoma Tax Commission
for cigarette sales made during a four-year period from a tribal-
owned convenience store located on reservation lands.334 At the
outset of the litigation, the district court held that the state could
not assess the tribe for back taxes owed because a significant pro-
portion of Oklahoma's estimated assessment represented cigarette
sales to Indians.335 The court, however, also reached the conclu-
sion that it would not be a violation of tribal sovereignty for the
state to prospectively collect cigarette taxes and impose record-
keeping requirements for all on-reservation sales made to non-
Indians.36 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's ruling on the grounds that the tribe exercises com-
plete sovereignty over all of its lands, which precludes the state
from imposing cigarette taxes on Indians and non-Indians alike
absent a Congressional grant of independent jurisdictional author-
331. The argument by the tribes that the potential revenue losses they were facing con-
stituted an infringement upon their right to self-govern was rejected by the Court because
not only did the state taxes not infringe upon their right to tax, but in addressing the es-
sence of their argument, the revenue losses must adversely affect the taxpayer. Colville,
447 U.S. at 156-57. As non-Indians were responsible for paying the cigarette taxes and
would not be deprived of the reservation services that the tribal cigarette tax revenues
funded then the tribal opposition to the state taxing regulations was not as strong as it
would have been had the taxes been directed at on-reservation "values." Id. at 157. Fur-
thermore, where the imposition of the state tax is deemed to be valid, the burden then falls
upon the Indian challenger to prove that any attendant record-keeping or reporting regula-
tions are not "reasonably necessary" means of preventing tax fraud by non-Indian custom-
ers. Id. at 160.
332. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
333. See generally Stacy Cook, Comment, Indian Sovereignty: State Tax Collection on
Indian Sales to Nontribal Members - States Have a Right Without a Remedy [Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma 111 S. Ct. 905
(1991)], 31 WASHBURN L.J. 130 (1991) (discussing the practical effects of the Court's deci-
sion in Potawatomi that would permit a state to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-
Indians but would not permit them to enforce that right by bringing suit against a tribe).
334. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 507.




ity.3 " Given that there had been no grant of jurisdictional author-
ity by Congress to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the district court to reinstate the
injunction against the state from imposing the cigarette tax collec-
tion regulations.338
Potawatomi would mark the first (and last) occasion that the
Supreme Court deigned to entertain a challenge by a state seeking
to concurrently enact collection and reporting requirements, as
well a means of enforcement, thus pushing the Court to address
the burning question: What remedies are available to a state seek-
ing to compel Indian cigarette vendors to assist in the collection of
excise taxes?
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court.3 9 In doing so, he reaffirmed the decisions reached in Moe
and Colville by holding that neither the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity or tribal sovereignty immunizes a tribe from having to col-
lect state cigarette taxes on sales to non-Indians.34 ° The gravamen
though of Oklahoma's argument was that the Court should either
abandon, or narrowly interpret, a tribal right to sovereign immu-
nity because it acts as a barrier to a state from enforcing its tax
regulations.341 Chief Justice Rehnquist flatly declined Oklahoma's
request.34 He briefly traced the doctrine of tribal sovereign im-
munity and, in conjunction with Congress' objectives in "encourag-
ing tribal self-sufficiency and economic development" through leg-
islation and the Court's prior support of such efforts, held that
Oklahoma could not initiate a lawsuit directly against the tribe as
a means of compelling the collection of state cigarette taxes.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's application of the tribal "self-
determination" rationale marked an about face for the Court from
the Moe and Colville decisions in that the balancing of state and
tribal interests in the area of state taxation upon non-Indians had,
in the past, uniformly weighed in favor of the state.3 4 He sought
337. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 888
F.2d 1303, 1306 (1989), affd in part, rev'd in part, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
338. Potawatomi, 888 F.2d at 1307.
339. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 506.
340. Id. at 512.
341. Id. at 510.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Although there is a significant difference between the rights of a state and the
remedies at its disposal (thus Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision was not an "about face"
per se), it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the Court's decision here with the outcome of
the Colville case where the tribes' abilities to maintain their self-sufficiency following the
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to distinguish this singular determination from prior decisions on
the basis that a state need not assert jurisdiction over "civil causes
of action," i.e., enforcement of state taxing regulations, in order to
validly require Indian cigarette vendors to collect state taxes on
non-Indian sales.34 Paradoxically, the Court's holding permits a
state to impose cigarette tax collection regulations on Indian ciga-
rette retailers but does not allow them the most efficient means of
ensuring the collection - that is, through civil suit. This outcome
did not escape the notice of Oklahoma which pointed out that such
cases as Moe and Colville essentially granted states a "right with-
out a remedy,"34 hence the reason the state requested that the
Court either abolish or narrowly construe a tribe's right to sover-
eign immunity. In dictum, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged
that while states are denied "from pursuing the[ir] most efficient
remedy," he nevertheless downplayed the decision by indicating
that states may still possibly hold individual agents or tribal offi-
cers liable for damages, pre-collect the tax from wholesalers, seize
unstamped cigarettes en route to the reservation, or enter into
mutually satisfactory agreements with the tribes for the collection
of the taxes.4 7 If none of these alternatives effect state goals, the
Court concluded, then the forum of last resort - Congress - could
be petitioned to intervene on behalf of the states.348
judgment was predicted to have been seriously compromised by the imposition of state
cigarette taxes.
345. Id. at 513.
346. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514.
347. Id.
348. Id. Justice Stevens authored a brief concurrence to the unanimous opinion and
closed with a statement essentially challenging the opinion of the Court. In it he stated:
"[mly purpose in writing separately is to emphasize that the Court's holding in effect rejects
the argument that this governmental entity the Tribe is completely immune from legal
process . . . the Court today recognizes that a tribe=s sovereign immunity from actions
seeking money damages does not necessarily extend to actions seeking equitable relief." Id.
at 515-16. Justice Stevens believed that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was an
anachronism, and he argued that in permitting the state to prospectively assess cigarette
taxes for sales to non-Indians, the Court implicitly limited the sovereign immunity of the
tribe. Id. at 515. This is because the state's request for prospective relief was tangential to
the principal matter of collecting back taxescthe money damages referenced by Justice
Stevenscand since the Court need not have entertained the issue, but chose to do so any-
way, then it in actuality qualified the protections afforded to tribes by the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted:
The District Court held that the Tribe could be required to collect the tax on sales to
nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court on
this point. While neither of these courts need have reached the question, they both
did. The question is fairly subsumed in the "questions presented" in the petition for
certiorari, and both parties have briefed it. We have the authority to decide it and
proceed to do so.
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E. New York Reprise
Having taken the dictum of the Potawatomi Court at face value,
the State of New York adopted precisely the suggestions made by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Beyond the earnest but unsuccessful
negotiations the state attempted to reach with the Seneca and
other tribes,349 the state's enactment of a regulatory scheme that
assessed the cigarette taxes directly on wholesalers instead of the
customer at the point of purchase brought about so much opposi-
tion by Indians that New York was forced to seize shipments of
unstamped cigarettes prior to delivery to the reservations. 5 ' Had
the state decided to undertake the Court's recommendation to ini-
tiate lawsuits directly against tribal officers or entities, it would
likely have found itself devoid of a means of legal recourse given
the limited circumstances where a non-Indian is capable of bring-
ing suit against a tribal entity for disputes arising on tribal
lands.35 Accordingly, given the dearth of legal remedies a state
Id. at 512.
While the Court embraced the notion that tribal sovereign immunity proscribed
legal avenues of enforcement against tribes that refuse to assist in the collection of state
imposed cigarette taxes, such as injunctions mandating the enforcement of collection, re-
cord-keeping, and reporting statutes, Justice Stevens astutely noted otherwise. The Court
later validated Justice Stevens' concurrence in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) by noting that "[i]n our interdependent and mobile
society . . . tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-
governance. This is evident when tribes take part in the Nation's commerce .... [Includ-
ing] sales of cigarettes to non-Indians." Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758. Although the Court
declined to limit the scope of tribal sovereign immunity, Justice Stevens dissented and was
joined by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg. Id. at 760. Justice Stevens' viewpoint has never
been formally adopted by the Court, or any state, so far as the record demonstrates, thus
setting the stage for the Court's most recent cigarette tax decision in Department of Taxa-
tion & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. and New York's subsequent discord with the Se-
neca tribe.
349. Hernandez, supra note 218. Despite the lepeated attempts by New York to secure
an agreement with the Senecas, a spokeswoman for the tribe indicated prior to the repeal
of the regulations that "[t]he Senecas have not taken a position on whether we will or will
not reach agreement with the state .... [But] I don't think the Seneca Nation will ever be
interested in becoming a tax collector for the state." Id.
350. See Glaberson, supra note 185.
351. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 759 (holding that sovereign immunity extends to
the commercial activities of a tribe when entering into agreements either on or off the res-
ervation, except when Congress has either expressly authorized the suit or where the tribe
has waived its immunity); Greene v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 980 F.2d 590, 597 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the petitioners could not file an adversary proceeding against the tribal-
run furniture business because it was considered to be a "subordinate economic enterprise"
of the tribe and, in the interests of economic development, sovereign immunity does not
stop at the boundaries of a reservation); Hardin v, White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d
476, 480 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that tribal officers acting within the scope of their author-
ity are shielded from prosecution on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity). But see City of
Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that
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can pursue in seeking enforcement of cigarette tax collection regu-
lations against a tribal vendor, it appears that, for all practical
effects, states truly have been given a right without a remedy.
Certainly, the State of New York could have demonstrated
stronger political will and held out against the public relations
battle waged by the Seneca and other tribes.3 5 ' But note that
when tax evasion is facilitated via remote Internet vendors, in the
large majority of circumstances, the taxing jurisdiction will have
no means of recourse because states cannot not pass laws (or seize
cigarette shipments) that can then be projected onto tribal lands
located in a separate state. Consequently, tax jurisdictions are
acutely constrained in their abilities to enforce the collection of
cigarette taxes owed from sales made by remote Indian vendors.
At their disposal, however, is the seldom employed Jenkins Act
that, perhaps if amended correctly, would potentially render moot
the claim that there exists no truly efficient legal remedy for
states to aid in the enforcement of cigarette tax collection statutes.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Jenkins Act has never been challenged by a remote ciga-
rette vendor operating from tribal lands. Indeed, the Jenkins Act
would first need to be enforced before it could be contested as vio-
lating tribal sovereignty or sovereign immunity. A determination
of the likelihood that the Act could sustain a challenge from a re-
mote Indian cigarette vendor is therefore merited.
Facially, the Jenkins Act appears to be indistinguishable from
the reporting regulations that the Supreme Court upheld in such
plaintiff could have sought declaratory judgment against individual Indians because they
did not possess valid tribal status and therefore could not invoke the protection of sovereign
immunity); Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 294 (Minn. 1996) (identifying three
fundamental characteristics that a tribal business must possess in order to invoke protec-
tion of sovereign immunity, which includes the organization of the business entity for a
purpose that is governmental in nature rather than conunercial, the tribe and business
entity must be linked in governing structure, and "federal policies intended to promote
Indian tribal autonomy must be furthered by the extension of immunity to the business
entity"); In re Ransom, 86 N.Y.2d 553, 559 (1995) (establishing determinative factors for
when a tribal run organization is to be considered a subordinate tribal organization and
thus able to invoke sovereign immunity, including organization under tribal laws versus
state or federal, purpose of the organization must be similar to or serve those of the tribe,
tribe maintains legal title to or ownership of property used by the organization, tribal offi-
cials must exercise administrative or financial control over the entity, whether the entity
generates its own revenue, and whether a suit against the entity will impact tribal re-
sources).
352. See supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
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cases as Colville and Milhelm Attea & Bros.; § 376 mandates that
cigarette vendors report to the tax jurisdiction the customer list
for the prior month, including the quantity and brand of cigarettes
sold.353 However, there are numerous distinctions between the
provisions of the Jenkins Act and the various state tax regulations
that have been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Most notably,
the Jenkins Act is a federal reporting statute that imposes crimi-
nal penalties on convicted violators. In all prior cases entertained
by the Court involving cigarette tax regulations, the dispute at
issue generally implicated a state's right to mandate the collection
of cigarette taxes by an Indian tribe for sales to non-Indians and
remittance to the appropriate jurisdiction. The only case that
even touched upon the consequences of noncompliance was Po-
tawatomi, which prohibited only the application of civil penalties.
Although several of the cases discussed heretofore involved report-
ing and record-keeping requirements, a challenge of the Jenkins
Act would exclusively involve a cigarette retailer's reporting re-
sponsibilities and possible criminal liability.
A. Tribal Sovereignty
In the current climate of cigarette taxation, states are contend-
ing with potentially hundreds of individual vendors that may or
may not be affiliated with federally recognized Indian tribes.54
While states are not necessarily seeking direct revenue collection
by the vendors at issue, they are interested in obtaining the
names of customers located in their respective jurisdictions so that
they may directly assess such individuals for the excise and sales
taxes owed.355 Taking into consideration that the Jenkins Act does
not directly impose excise or sales taxes on interstate cigarette
purchases, but instead imposes reporting requirements on tribal
vendors for sales to non-Indians, the categorical preemption and
infringement analyses employed by the Court are inappropriate in
353. 15 U.S.C. § 376.
354. "Harry Wallace, chief of the Unkechaug Nation and owner of the Poospatuck Smoke
Shop and Trading Company... [and] his fellow shop owners feel that their right to sell tax-
free cigarettes ... is nothing short of the lawful exercise of their sovereignty." (emphasis
added). Reeves, supra note 6.
355. "'We would applaud any effort to make it easier for the state to recoup the excise
taxes,' said Timothy Connoly, a spokesman for the Massachusetts Department of Revenue.
'If the [Jenkins Act] had some teeth or was used more often, Massachusetts would be able
to get more tax.'" Jennifer Fenn, Meehan: Bay State Losing Millions in Taxes on Internet
Tobacco Sales, LOWELL SuN, Aug. 13, 2002, at Al.
Fall 2003
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 42
determining the validity of the Jenkins Act."5 6 Instead, the only
relevant test that has been discussed thus far applicable to the
reporting regulations of the Act is the balancing inquiry of state,
federal and tribal interests.357 The preliminary question though is
whether the Act in its entirety can be applied to tribal vendors.
To make this determination, an analysis of case law pertaining to
federal statutes of general applicability must be undertaken.
1. Federal Laws of General Applicability
The Jenkins Act is a law of general applicability.3"8 Pursuant to
§ 376(a), the Act applies broadly to all "persons" engaged in the
sale of cigarettes in interstate commerce."' In Federal Power
Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,36 ° the Court held that "a gen-
eral statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and
their property interests."36' The Court,"' as well as lower courts,
356. The Court has held that "when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian
tribe or its members inside Indian country, rather than non-Indians, we have employed,
instead of a balancing inquiry, 'a more categorical approach: [A]bsent cession of jurisdiction
or other federal statutes permitting it,' we have held, a State is without power to tax...
reservation Indians." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 457
(1995) (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 258 (1992)) (holding, inter alia, that the state could not impose motor fuels excise
taxes upon Indian retailers). Because the legal incidence of state cigarette excise and sales
taxes fall upon non-Indian consumers, the "categorical approach" described by the Court is
not the exclusive means in determining the validity of the Jenkins Act.
357. Despite the fact that the balancing test is applied only in the case of state statutes,
the direct reporting between tribal merchants and the several states regarding sales to
non-Indians dictate that consideration of all interests be made before arriving at a conclu-
sion as to the applicability of the Jenkins Act to tribal vendors.
358. "The 'generality' of a statute refers to the scope of the class of persons or entities to
which the statute applies. For example, a statute addressed to 'all persons' (such as crimi-
nal statutes) would apply to a large class and thus have general applicability." Vicki Li-
mas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes:
Respecting the Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 AIZ. STATE L.J. 681, 694 (1994).
359. 15 U.S.C. § 376(a). Section 375 defines 'person" to include "corporations, compa-
nies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as indi-
viduals." 15 U.S.C. § 375(1).
360. 362 U.S. 99 (1960) (holding that the Federal Power Act authorized the eminent
domain of Indian lands held in fee simple in order to construct a power plant).
361. Id. at 116.
362. Professor Limas notes that the Supreme Court has used the "Tuscarora rule" on
only one other occasion. Limas, supra note 358, at 699 n.116. In Escondido Mutual Water
Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1983), the Court held that the Mis-
sion Band Indians did not possess the power to prevent the Federal Power Commission
("FPC") from using tribal lands for the construction of a hydroelectric plant. This conclu-
sion was reached only because there were no treaty rights to veto the decision of the FPC
and because the legislative history of the Federal Power Act indicated that a provision that
would have required tribal consent for a license to construct the plant was explicitly re-
jected. Id.
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subsequently limited this seemingly broad application to "excep-
tional circumstances."" In United States v. Farris, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals articulated three exceptions to the Tus-
carora rule.6 5 With respect to federal laws that are silent on the
issue of applicability to Indian tribes and/or individual Indians,
the court indicated that such laws are presumed to apply to Indi-
ans and non-Indians alike unless (1) the law touches "exclusive
rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters,"3 6  (2)
would otherwise "abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian trea-
ties, or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some other
means that Congress intended Indians to be exempt from such
laws.3 68 The Ninth Circuit later expounded on the first of the three
exceptions in Donovan v. Coeur dAlene Tribal Farm3 69 wherein it
determined that the provisions of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act applied to a tribal-operated farm."' The court noted
that "a farm that sells produce on the open market and in inter-
state commerce is not an aspect of tribal self-government ...
[A]nd[,] because it is in virtually every respect a normal commer-
cial farming enterprise, we believe that its operation free of fed-
eral health and safety regulations is 'neither profoundly intramu-
ral . . . nor essential to self-government."371 Further, "the tribal
363. Limas, supra note 358, at 699.
364. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980). In Farris, the court considered the appeal of Indians
and non-Indians who had been convicted under the Organized Crime Control Act for con-
ducting an illegal gambling operation on Indian trust land. Id. at 890.
365. Id. at 893-94.
366. "[U]nless Congress has removed those rights through legislation explicitly directed
at Indians." Id. at 893. The Farris court noted that with regard to the gambling businesses
at issue, the operations were not "profoundly intramural (the casinos' clientele was largely
non-Indian) nor essential to self-government." Id. (emphasis added).
367. Id. The court indicated that the rule only applies to "subjects specifically covered in
treaties." Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
368. Id. at 893-94. See also United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1484-85 (9th Cir.
1995) (upholding the imposition of criminal penalties on an Indian who was charged);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 179
(1980) ("When tradition did not recognize a sovereign immunity... this Court would only
recognize one only if Congress expressly conferred one.") (Rehnquist, J. concurring). Pursu-
ant to the third exception of the Tuscarora rule there does not exist any evidence, either in
the form of legislative history or otherwise, that indicates Indians are to be exempt from
the reporting or penalty guidelines of the Jenkins Act.
369. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
370. Id. at 1114.
371. Id. at 1116 (quoting Farris, 624 F.2d at 893). Professor Limas notes that the
phrase "purely intramural" has been read both narrowly and expansively by various Courts
of Appeals. Where a statute fails to provide for an exclusion for tribes, and such statute is
modeled after a statute that contains an exclusion for tribes, courts will treat the statute as
ambiguous and invoke the canon of statutory construction applicable only in Indian cases
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self-government exception is designed to except purely intramural
matters such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance
rules, and domestic relations from the general rule that otherwise
applicable federal statutes apply to Indian tribes.""1 2
Courts have distinguished between what are "essentially gov-
ernmental functions from commercial activities undertaken by
tribes and have classified actual tribal government entities as as-
pects of 'self-government.' 373 For example, the Ninth Circuit
found in U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Re-
view Comm'n374 that a tribal employer, despite retaining aspects of
self-government, was subject to federal health and safety regula-
tions because it "employ[ed] a significant number of non-Native
Americans and s[old] virtually all of its finished product to non-
Native Americans through channels of interstate commerce.
The Ninth Circuit has also clarified that "[t]he self-government
exception applies only where the tribe's decision-making power is
usurped."
3 71
When the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is applied to the Jen-
kins Act, it is apparent that the provisions do not implicate the
right of tribal self-government or purely intramural matters.
Principally, § 376 applies only the commercial activities of a tribe
or tribal member engaged in the sale of cigarettes through inter-
state commerce to non-Indians. 77 The reporting requirements of
the Act do not apply to on-reservation sales to tribal members.
Additionally, the provisions of § 376 are unrelated to intramural
matters such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance
that dictates the intention to abrogate a sovereign right must be explicitly construed by
Congress and will not be imputed. Limas, supra note 358, at 721.
372. Id.
373. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 260
F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion had no jurisdiction over age discrimination complaints made against an Indian tribe
because the dispute was purely intramural in that it did not concern non-Indians as em-
ployers, employees, or customers).
374. 935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1991).
375. Id. at 184 (citation omitted).
376. Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683,
685 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that employees of a tribal-run lumber mill were required to
contribute to a pension fund, pursuant to ERISA, despite a tribal ordinance mandating that
tribal members contribute to a tribal pension plan).
377. Though the reporting requirements would apply to sales to Indians purchasing
cigarettes through interstate commerce, it should be noted that in most circumstances an
enrolled tribal member will be able to challenge the assessment on the basis of immunity
from state taxation.
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rules, or domestic relations.378 Finally, § 376 does not usurp tribal
decision-making authority because it simply imposes a reporting
requirement without impeding a tribe's ability to operate a retail
cigarette operation on their own terms.379
The Ninth Circuit has applied the Tuscarora rule to federal
criminal statutes as well as to employment-related regulatory
provisions. In United States v. Baker,80 the court held tribal
members liable for criminal violations of the CCTA and the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act because they could
not satisfy any of the three exclusion categories.38'
While a determination of whether the Jenkins Act as applied
operates in contravention of the rights guaranteed by prior Indian
treaties would need to be made on a case-by-case basis,3"' the
Baker court found persuasive the fact that the CCTA does not
burden a treaty-protected right - that being trading rights of the
tribe - but rather makes it a crime to fail to pay applicable state
taxes on cigarettes that are legally subject to taxation.383 A strong
378. This represents the narrow approach in defining matters that are to be considered
"purely intramural." However, since there exists no ambiguity in the Jenkins Act in rela-
tion to similar federal statutes, the expansive form of interpretation as described by Profes-
sor Limas in supra note 358 is inapplicable.
379. In Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989), the court up-
held the application of ERISA to the Bad River Band of the Chippewa Tribe. Id. The Court
reasoned that the application of ERISA would not interfere with tribal self-governance in
intramural matters in part because "ERISA merely requires reporting and accounting
standards for the protection of employees." Id. at 935. Based upon the court's reasoning, a
strong analogy can be drawn in support of the application of § 376 to tribal vendors.
380. 63 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1995).
381. See Baker, 63 F.3d at 1484-86.
382. As noted, the Tuscarora rule does not apply if the application of the federal stat-
ute(s) would "abrogate rights guaranteed by federal treaties." Donovan, 751 F.2d at 1116.
Thus, a tribe must have a treaty with the federal government to be able to invoke this
exception. The Court held in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) that a tribal mem-
ber could be convicted of violating the Bald Eagle Protection Act even though his tribe was
guaranteed rights to hunt (although the express right to hunt eagles was not mentioned in
the treaty) and fish on tribal lands through an existing treaty. Notwithstanding the fact
that the legislative history of the act did not expressly declare Congress' intent to abrogate
treaty rights, there existed "clear and reliable evidence" (in legislative history) that Con-
gress actually considered the potential conflict between its action and treaty rights and
"chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty." Dion, 476 U.S. at 739-40. Because
"clear and reliable" evidence cannot always be found in a bill's legislative history - as is the
case with the Jenkins Act - courts are left in the difficult position of attempting to decipher
congressional intent and balancing that against the risk of potentially abrogating a right
secured by treaty. Therefore, depending upon the tribe that challenges the applicability of
the Jenkins Act, a court may err on the side of caution and read the relevant treaty rights
broadly and decide that the reporting regulations of § 376 would abrogate, for example, the
right of a tribe to engage in commerce with non-Indians.
383. Baker, 63 F.3d at 1485. As the court noted in a previous case upholding the imposi-
tion of a federal income tax on the income of an Indian smokeshop, the tribal treaty was
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correlation can be made between the applicability of the CCTA
and the Jenkins Act to individual Indians and tribes in that the
only appreciable difference between the two statutes is that the
former requires taxes to be paid to the relevant jurisdiction, while
the latter simply requires that cigarette sales be reported to the
relevant tax jurisdiction to help effectuate the payment of excise
and sales taxes. In accordance with the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit, the Jenkins Act is likely to be deemed valid as applied
against individual Indians and tribes because it does not impose a
burden upon what would traditionally be considered a right pro-
vided by treaty, nor does it surpass the requirements imposed by
the CCTA.
38
2. Balancing State, Federal, and Tribal Interests
As a corollary to the decisions reached by the Court, after bal-
ancing "the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at
stake" as to the validity of reporting guidelines designed to assist
in the collection of cigarette taxes from non-Indians, the federal
Jenkins Act would likely be sustained on the grounds that it is
designed to "ensure compliance with lawful taxes that might eas-
ily be evaded through purchases [from] reservations." s The
Court's repeated holdings in support of a state's ability to require
Indians to assist in the collection of cigarette taxes on sales to non-
Indians is strongly supportive of the federal government's ability
to impose record-keeping and reporting requirements on Indian
retailers, particularly in light of the express authority granted to
Congress by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution in "regulat[ing]
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes."' 6 As previously discussed,
this mandate has consistently been interpreted by the Court as
found not to have abrogated the right to tax because it was "not a burden on a treaty-
protected right, but upon the income earned through the exercise of that right." Id. (quot-
ing Dillon v. United States, 792 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1986)).
384. As to whether a federal regulatory scheme would be considered burdensome to an
Indian merchant is, of course, a subjective determination. Despite this fact, the assessment
of income taxes, as was the case in Dillon v. United States, could arguably be considered
more burdensome than the imposition of periodic reporting regulations. In addition to
filing an annual income tax return, the taxpayer's income will be diminished, thus under-
mining the overriding goals of fostering Indian self-sufficiency and economic independence.
385. Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 62 (1994).
"The purpose of this bill is to assist the States in collecting State-imposed sales and use
taxes on cigarettes .... [Tihere is a general demand for this legislation because there are
several States that have no tax on cigarettes ... [accordingly,] the States lose a great deal
of revenue." (remarks of Representative Adolph J. Sabath (D-Ill.) 95 CONG. REC. 6346.
386. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Vol. 42
Jenkins Act
imbuing Congress with a nearly exclusive ability to establish and
enforce objectives aimed at reconciling the interests of the states
and Indian tribes.
387
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, s8 the Court held
that Arizona could not tax on-reservation commercial activities of
the Navajo for the reasons that Congress had enacted exhaustive
legislation in that area (as well as being involved in the day-to-day
operations of the timber business) and because the state could not
demonstrate more than just a need to raise revenues.8 9 Within
the context of state cigarette excise taxes and the Jenkins Act, the
balancing test applied by the Court in such cases as White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe heavily favors the federal and state interests
over those of the tribes. As an initial matter, congressional legis-
lation in the area of cigarette excise taxation is much less compre-
hensive than was the federal government's involvement in the on-
reservation activities of the Navajo and lumber contractors in
White Mountain Apache Tribe.3 90
Having resolved possible invalidation by related federal stat-
utes," ' the inquiry proceeds to weigh the interests of the federal
government and the various states in assuring that cigarette ex-
cise and sales taxes are collected on sales to non-Indians, versus
the interests of the tribes. The preceding discussion of the Court's
decisions in this area establish that the states' interests in collect-
ing validly imposed taxes outweighs that of Indian vendors in not
wanting to act as quasi tax-collection agents. Beyond the prior
case holdings alone, there are the sizeable revenue losses that
states are currently facing in the area of remote vendor cigarette
sales. As noted, states such as California have estimated quar-
terly revenue losses in excess of $10 million39 with projected an-
387. See supra notes 231-249 and accompanying text.
388. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
389. Id. at 143.
390. See id. at 146. For example, all of the timber owned on the Fort Apache Reserva-
tion where the contracting took place was owned by the United States for the benefit of the
tribe and could be sold only with the consent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. In addi-
tion, all of the proceeds from timber sales were to be used for the benefit of tribal members.
Id. By taxing the non-Indian contractor, the economic incidence of the tax would likely be
passed forward to the federal government, and ultimately, the Indians that received the
sale proceeds.
391. The term "preemption" is inappropriate in the context of two or more federal stat-
utes; rather, the terms "conflict" or "contradiction" better describe the effect of one law
invalidating another. "Preemption" is defined as "[tihe principle (derived from the Su-
premacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or
regulation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
392. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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nual revenue losses nationwide to reach into the billions by
2005."'3 Furthermore, because § 376 does not mandate the collec-
tion of taxes owed but rather just the periodic submittal of innocu-
ous customer and transaction information, the state and federal
interests at stake militate against those of Indian retailers.
In accordance with the language of the Court in White Mountain
Apache Tribe that there may need to be more than just revenue
interests in the balance to support the imposition of a state tax
against non-Indians engaged in commerce with Indians, the pre-
ventative and compensatory state health care programs that are
often funded through the excise tax demonstrate the general wel-
fare of state residents also hinge partially on the collection of ciga-
rette excise taxes.394
The objective interests of the federal government in ensuring
that remote cigarette vendors report their monthly sales to the
respective states are several. These include the desire to allocate
law enforcement resources to objectives other than the investiga-
tion and prosecution of violations under the Jenkins Act, to avoid
having states independently initiate efforts against Indian ciga-
rette vendors, which may potentially disrupt the often fragile rela-
tionships that exist between tribes and state governments, as well
as seeing that states collect the revenue that is legally owed to
them.395 The effectuation of the latter interest will help to ensure
that states are able to independently meet their revenue needs
without having to rely upon Congress to pass measures that will
aid in closing their budget shortfalls. Collectively, the federal in-
terests supporting compliance with the reporting requirements of
the Jenkins Act are likely to weigh heavily against the tribal in-
terests that the Court has considered and rejected on prior occa-
sions.
The salient tribal interests pertain to whether tax and reporting
guidelines may undermine broader federal objectives of creating
and sustaining tribal self-sufficiency. Such an analysis is inher-
ently subjective. As discussed, the Court has alternately held that
imposing cigarette tax regulations upon Indian retailers is not
pre-empted on the basis of possibly undermining tribal self-
sufficiency,"9 but that a state cannot seek to enforce its rights
393. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 1.
394. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
395. Supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
396. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
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through suit because such an action would threaten Congress' de-
sire to promote tribal self-sufficiency and economic development
7.3 9
Justices Brennan's opinion in Colville, with which Justice Mar-
shall joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part, demon-
strates that a variety of arguments be made in support of tribal
autonomy from tax regulations.398 Of particular importance are
the consequences the imposition and collection of state cigarette
taxes will pose for revenue collection by individual Indians and
tribes.399 Corollary to the revenue reduction argument, Brennan's
opinion further contended that the success of a state in imposing
its taxing will necessarily mean that the Indian cigarette retailer
will be placed at a competitive disadvantage. 0 It is not, according
to Brennan, the mutual exclusivity of these consequences that
supports their position, but rather their collective impact, which
conflicts with underlying federal policies.40 ' This rationale is un-
tenable at best and dangerous at worst.
As Justice Brennan acknowledged in his opinion, "Moe made
clear that Indians do not have an absolute entitlement to achieve
some particular sales volume by passing their tax-exempt status
to non-Indian customers.'" °2 It was argued, however, that a state
should not be able to impose cigarette taxes that would essentially
compel a tribe to forego levying its own taxes on the product
thereby placing Indian retailers at a competitive disadvantage.
To remedy this problem, tax credits could be offered to non-
Indians purchasing cigarettes from Indian retailers that would
mitigate the attendant loss of business when the state excise and
sales taxes are imposed. This is how the several states accommo-
date conflicting tax regimes. The dissenting portion of Brennan's
opinion, however, did not advocate a credit mechanism; instead, it
concluded that the federal approval of the tribal tax schemes
should operate to "oust[] inconsistent state law." ' 4 According to
such logic, a tribe need only enact a cigarette excise tax and they
397. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510
(1991).
398. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 165-69 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
399. Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
400. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
401. Id. at 170-72 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting). The argument goes
that a tribe will be forced to make decisions that involve the possible sacrifice of needed tax
dollars in order to remain competitive.
402. Id. at 173 (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
403. See id. at 172-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
404. Colville, 447 U.S. at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
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will be sanctioned to market a tax exemption to non-Indians,
which is precisely what the Court, and Justice Brennan, had re-
peatedly held to be impermissible.
The second flaw in Justice Brennan's argument is his statement
that permitting Indian retailers to market an exemption in the
area of cigarette sales when there exists concurrent taxation by
the state and tribe would not open the door to tax-exempt sales by
Indians of "every imaginable good."' °5 In 1979, when Colville was
decided, there may have been merit to the argument that fears of
this occurring would be "substantially overdrawn."0 6 In this age of
online commerce though, the likelihood of widespread tax evasion
occurring is a very real threat indeed. Although many consumers
currently shop online in order to enjoy the tax savings, they are
legally liable to pay use taxes on goods purchased online." 7 Under
Justice Brennan's proposal, if the goods were being purchased
from a remote Indian vendor that imposed tribal taxes, then they
would be legally exempt from ever having to pay state use or ex-
cise taxes.
A further interest of tribal vendors is their desire to not provide
direct assistance to states in collecting excise and sales taxes.0 8
Though valid, this is unlikely to be of great relevance in the bal-
ance of the parties' interests. Section 376 of the Act mandates
that interstate cigarette vendors provide a monthly summary of
their clients in the respective taxing state, including the custom-
ers' addresses, quantity and brands purchased, so that the state
may directly assess the consumer for the excise and sales taxes
owed." 9 These regulations are in fact less onerous on the retailer
than were the reporting statutes challenged in Colville, where the
Indian merchants were required to also keep track of all cigarette
sales to tribal members as well as non-members.410 The tribes in
Colville failed to demonstrate how Washington's reporting regula-
tions were not a reasonably necessary means of preventing tax
fraud, 11 and it would be difficult to demonstrate how § 376 would
be either.
405. Id. at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
406. Id.
407. McClure, supra note 23, at 567 (commenting that the "use tax . .. [is] levied on
purchasers in ... [online] transactions (but rarely collected from consumers) because states
lack the power under our Constitution to levy sales tax on the transactions").
408. See, e.g., supra note 354.
409. 15 U.S.C. § 376(a)(2).
410. Colville, 447 U.S. at 159.
411. Id. at 160.
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Section 376 does not require the retailer to affirmatively assess
the tax - the relevant state tax administrator will do so - nor does
the reporting requirement of the Act undermine the confidential-
ity of a retailer's customer lists since state administrators limit
their use of the information for tax assessment purposes.412 The
compilation of the customer lists would also be a relatively easy
task to accomplish for a remote vendor since all Internet cigarette
sales must be made with a credit card and the customer data will
already be stored electronically or included in past invoices. This
would obviate any claims by vendors that they are unaware of
their customers' names, addresses, quantities, or brands pur-
chased, which may otherwise occur with on-reservation cash
transactions. Finally, it should be noted that over fifty years ago,
the court in Consumer Mail Order Ass'n of America concluded that
§ 376 "is [not] unreasonable or inappropriate to the reasonable
ends of Congress to prevent the use of facilities of interstate com-
merce in evading or violating state laws.""3
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Tribal sovereign immunity developed largely as a vital adjunct
to the Court's long-standing recognition of tribal sovereignty.414
The immunity from suit absent willful consent is a fundamental
aspect of the federalist form of government,4 5 and extends to such
extra-constitutional entities as foreign states and Indian tribes.
Sovereign immunity enjoyed by tribes has, in many respects,
withstood the repeated challenges from states and individuals bet-
ter than the original tenets of tribal sovereignty.4 7 As evidenced
by Chief Justice Rehnquist's affirmation of tribal immunity from
412. See supra accompanying text to note 86.
413. Consumer Mail Order Ass'n of America v. McGrath, 94 F. Supp. 705 (1950), affd
340 U.S. 925 (1951).
414. See Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immu-
nity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental
Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 27 TULSA L. REV. 661, 665 (2002) (discussing the
development and implications of tribal sovereign immunity).
415. Both states and the federal government enjoy the power of "defin[ing] when and
under what circumstances each ... will permit suit or other legal actions against itself,"
which is an inherent element to the sovereign status enjoyed by the entities. Id. at 669.
416. Id. at 675.
417. "To date, our cases have sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a
distinction based on where the tribal activities occurred." Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
New Mexico, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (finding that tribal sovereignty does not bar a state from
imposing taxes upon a tribe engaged in commercial activities outside of Indian country).
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suit in Potawatomi, the Court has exhibited deference to Congress
regarding modifications to the scope of immunity."' For the os-
tensible reason that Congress desired to "encourag[e] tribal self-
sufficiency and economic development," the Potawatomi Court de-
clined to narrow the scope of tribal immunity from suit,"' yet an-
omalously it granted the state authority to impose tax collection
obligations,2 ° which, if adhered to by the tribe, would likely un-
dermine the very congressional goals invoked by the Court in sus-
taining the precept of sovereign immunity. Despite this incongru-
ity, the penalty provisions of the Jenkins Act would not act to un-
dermine Congress' intention to sustain tribal immunity from suit
because § 377 imposes criminal punishment to be enforced exclu-
sively by the federal government. 2 '
For nearly two hundred years, the federal government has
maintained criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian
lands.22 Known as the Indian Country Crimes Act ("ICCA"), 18
U.S.C. § 1152 ("§ 1152") provides that:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States ... shall extend to Indian Country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one In-
dian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to
any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who
418. "Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to
limit it. Although Congress has occasionally authorized limited classes of suits against
Indian tribes, it has never authorized suits to enforce tax assessments . .. [u]nder these
circumstances, we are not disposed to modify the long-established principle of tribal sover-
eign immunity." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
510 (1991).
419. Id. (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216
(1987)).
420. Id. at 512.
421. 15 U.S.C. § 377. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
422. While § 1152 exempts crimes committed by Indians against Indians, the Major
Crimes Act provides jurisdiction over major crimes by Indians, regardless of the status of
the victim. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, provides that:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson,
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within Indian country,
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of
the above offenses within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2001).
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has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case
where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respec-
tively.2 3
The predecessor to the ICCA was enacted for the purposes of
applying federal criminal laws to Indian territories where state
statutes were inapplicable and a vacuum of criminal laws would
have otherwise occurred. 24 Early on the Court broadly interpreted
the predecessor to the ICCA to apply uniformly to Indians and
non-Indians. Chief Justice Roger Taney stated in U.S. v.
Rogers426 that "Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits
of the United States are subject to their authority[;] ... Congress
may by law punish any offence committed there, no matter
whether the offender be a white man or an Indian.12'7  Gradually
the three exceptions428 identified in the act were interpreted more
in accordance with their literal intent429 and so developed a sub-
stantive body of law relating to the scope of the ICCA as applied
against Indians.
423. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2001). "Indian Country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. See supra
note 6. The term "person" in § 1152 encompasses federal and state governments. Accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, "§ 1152 does not state that victims of... crimes
must be non-Indian "persons" (but rather is applicable] ( . . .regardless of the nature or
identity of the non-Indian victim - including... the government)." United States v. Errol,
292 F.3d 1159, 1164 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). This is in stark contrast to the Major Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1153, which "does not extend to crimes against government entities." Id. at
1164.
424. See CANBY, supra note 12, at 121.
425. See infra note 427.
426. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
427. Id. at 572. The defendant, William Rogers was a white man who had emigrated
into the Cherokee Nation by marriage and was "incorporated ...with the said tribe of
Indians as one of them, and was so treated, recognized, and adopted by the said tribe, and
the proper authorities thereof, and exercised all the rights and privileges of a Cherokee
Indian in the said tribe... [such that] he became a citizen of the Cherokee nation." Id. at
571. He was accused of murdering Jacob Nicholson, also a white man, who "had in like
manner become a Cherokee Indian." Id. For a scathing assessment of Justice Taney's
decision in Rogers, see WILKINS, supra note 221, at 38-49. Professor Wilkins rails, in part,
against Justice Taney for fabricating history of federal/tribal interaction that would subse-
quently serve as the basis for further state encroachment on Indian lands. Id. at 43.
428. The three exceptions are: (1) Offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, (2) Indian committing any offense in Indian country who has
been punished by local tribal laws, and (3) where the exclusive jurisdiction over the given
offense has been secured to the Indian tribe. § 1152.
429. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606 (1916) (holding that the United
States could not prosecute an Indian accused of committing adultery with another Indian
on the Sioux Indian Reservation).
Duquesne Law Review
The Court's interpretation of the first exception codified in §
1152 is that tribal jurisdiction is absolute when an Indian commits
what is essentially a victimless crime on tribal lands, and in an
area upon which Congress has not legislated. 4" The definition of
"victimless," while obviously subjective, can be considered as cov-
ering those crimes that (1) do not result in physical harm to an-
other, or (2) would be more appropriately governed by tribal law.
Because the first exception to § 1152 creates what has been con-
strued as a blanket protection, aside from any of the major crimes
included in 18 U.S.C. § 1153, from federal criminal jurisdiction
over crimes between Indians,431 the second exemption codified in §
1152 must pertain solely to crimes committed by Indians against
non-Indians.432 In such cases, § 1152 explicitly provides for the
application of federal criminal statutes to offenses that have not
been prosecuted by the Indian tribe, regardless of whether a tribal
statute prohibits the criminal activitie(s) at issue.
However, due to the unique nature of the Jenkins Act, in that it
is a federal criminal statute intended to protect the interests of
the several states by requiring direct reporting to state tax admin-
istrators, and given that there is a complete absence of case law
dealing with tax-related crimes by Indians against state govern-
ments, each element of the two-pronged analysis of the first statu-
tory exception is separately instructive in determining whether
the application of § 377 to Indians would be appropriate. This is
true even though Congress has legislated in the area of excise tax
evasion and the bifurcated analysis has previously only been ap-
plied to crimes involving only Indians. The interests at issue -
rights of tribal self-government and potentially billions in tax
revenues - dictate that more than just a cursory inquiry into the
appropriateness of applying § 377 to remote Indian cigarette ven-
dors is required.
Through the Jenkins Act, Congress explicitly sought to enjoin
violations of state tax laws that, if evaded, would result in severe
financial hardship to states. 43 The states' increased reliance upon
cigarette excise tax revenues as a means to fund essential preven-
tative and compensatory health programs has increased the
stakes in the cigarette tax war far beyond what was contemplated
430. See id. at 605.
431. CANBY, supra note 12, at 124.
432. See id. at 127.
433. See supra note 66 and text accompanying note 67.
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when the Act was first passed. Indeed, at issue is the annual col-
lection of potentially billions of dollars nationwide.434 Where states
have not dedicated the revenues collected from cigarette excise
taxes to the funding of smoking-related health care initiatives,435
the revenues generated from the excise tax are often crucial in
helping states to close budget shortfalls and keep vital govern-
ment services operating.4 36 Given the potential for indirect physi-
cal harm resulting from cigarette tax evasion, it cannot be said
that the willful assistance by remote Indian cigarette vendors in
violating the Jenkins Act can be considered "victimless" crimes as
contemplated by the Court in cases such as U.S. v. Quiver.437
The second prong of analysis instructive in determining
whether § 377 should be applied is whether the failure of Indian
cigarette vendors to comply with the reporting provision of the
Jenkins Act would be more appropriately governed by tribal laws.
Complicity by tribal or individual remote cigarette vendors in vio-
lating - sometimes blatantly438 - a federal criminal statute does not
constitute behavior that "is to be controlled by the customs and
laws of the tribe.'"39 The Quiver Court found persuasive in deny-
ing federal criminal jurisdiction over an Indian for committing
adultery the fact that Congress had never legislated on such mat-
ters and instead left for tribes to decide in light of their customs
whether or not to adjudicate.44 ° With respect to the Jenkins Act,
however, Congress has expressly crafted penalties for persons
found to be in violation of the reporting guidelines, which weighs
in favor of applying § 377 to remote Indian cigarette vendors.
In addition, the notion of a tribal court allocating resources to
adjudicate the claims of a state claiming that a tribe or its mem-
bers have refused to assist in the collection of cigarette excise
taxes is unlikely given the general view by tribes that the imposi-
tion of state taxes is a violation of sovereignty. Assuming ar-
guendo, that a tribal court would even entertain the thought of
hearing a state's claims, it is highly unlikely that the tribe has
enacted penalties to punish its members for failing to adhere to
state tax reporting regulations. Accordingly, since there is little
434. Supra note 15.
435. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
436. Supra note 5.
437. See Quiver, 241 U.S. at 606.
438. See Hancock, supra note 6.
439. Quiver, 241 U.S. at 605-06.
440. Id. at 605.
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chance of a tribe maintaining preventative or corrective measures
for possible violations of § 376, the second exception to § 1152 re-
garding federal enforcement of criminal statutes violated by Indi-
ans against non-Indians supports the application of the Enclaves
Act to remote Indian cigarette vendors such that they should be
held liable under the penalty provisions of the Jenkins Act.
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted § 1152 to
only apply to criminal acts committed within the sole and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States where situs of the offense is
an element of the crime.441 In United States v. White,"2 the court
held that as a preliminary matter the federal criminal statute at
issue must be within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, meaning those laws that are passed by Congress in
the exercise of its police powers over federal property.443 The ap-
plication of the ICCA was later expanded by the same court in
United States v. Blue,4" where, in holding that the federal gov-
ernment maintained jurisdiction over drug offenses committed on
Indian lands, the court noted that § 1152 was applicable to all
general federal crimes, including those that may be subject to
penalties under the tribal criminal code. 45 The court ruled that
federal jurisdiction over the offense did not constitute an in-
fringement upon tribal sovereignty because the crime charged was
not part of an area that had traditionally been left to tribal gov-
ernment. 6
The conclusion that can be reached from the court's rationale is
that if an area of criminal jurisdiction has traditionally been left
to Indian tribes, Congress will need to explicitly provide for the
application of a general federal criminal law to Indians acting on
tribal lands, but if a particular crime has not traditionally been
left to the tribes to adjudicate, then general federal criminal laws
shall be held to apply to Indians on tribal lands. Accordingly,
441. Infra note 442.
442. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that the federal government could not assert
jurisdiction over an Indian for the illegal killing of a bald eagle because the tribe has main-
tained a traditional right to hunt on its reservation and that the right has been recognized
by Congress in prior treaty agreements).
443. Id. at 454.
444. 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983).
445. Id. at 384-85. The Turtle Mountain Tribal Code provided that marijuana posses-
sion and distribution was a tribal offense, subject to imprisonment and/or monetary fines.
Id. at 384. The defendant argued that because the charge was an enumerated tribal crime,
then it was inappropriate for the federal government to maintain jurisdiction in the case.
Id.
446. Id. at 385.
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since the enforcement of federal cigarette excise tax reporting
statutes are not within what would be considered a traditional
area of tribal jurisdiction, then the Jenkins Act would therefore
likely fall under the aegis of § 1152 and be held to apply against
Indian cigarette vendors, both tribal and individuals alike.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Can the many states that have felt the pinch of remote Indian
cigarette vendors rest easy? The Jenkins Act is the remedy the
myriad tax jurisdictions have sought to help prevent the evasion
of their cigarette excise taxes. But given the lackluster enforce-
ment of the Act by the DOJ and FBI, it seems as though the rem-
edy at their disposal is a hollow one indeed. In light of the current
deficiencies in the Jenkins Act, several questions emerge: Should
the penalties for violations of the Act be enhanced? Should en-
forcement authority remain with the DOJ and FBI? Should it be
shifted to the ATF? The states? And, most importantly, does
Congress need to amend the Jenkins Act so that it will affirma-
tively apply to Indian cigarette vendors, or will stronger penalties
and greater enforcement be sufficient in preventing the wide-
spread tax evasion that will continue to occur?
Prior to the advent of the Internet, compliance with the Jenkins
Act was either ubiquitous based upon the fear of criminal sanc-
tions,"' or non-existent, given the federal government's distaste
for enforcing state tax laws"8 coupled with limitations on re-
sources.449 In either event, the absence of meaningful amendments
over the years has largely rendered the Jenkins Act an anachro-
nism. To help remedy this problem there exist two fundamental
options: escalate the penalties under § 377, or ensure enforcement
by the DOJ and the FBI. However, to treat the enhancement of
criminal penalties under the Act and enforcement of those penal-
ties as mutually exclusive ends would be a disservice to the sev-
eral states.
Without strong penalties, federal enforcement of § 377 will be
ineffectual given that the DOJ has demonstrated a clear desire to
avoid enforcing the Jenkins Act unless it can be used as a means
to apply a more serious felony violation.45 ° Therefore, as a practi-
447. Supra note 82 and accompanying text.
448. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
449. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
450. Supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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cal matter, remote cigarette vendors have little to fear in violating
a statute that exclusively imposes misdemeanor penalties. But
given current excise tax rates on cigarettes, the penalties provided
for in § 377 are not commensurate with the revenue losses to
states, which may climb into the billions of dollars in the coming
years. It should be noted that excise tax rates have in some states
escalated 15,000 percent since the Jenkins Act was passed over
4511fifty years ago, while the penalties have remained the same.
Section 377 should be reflective of the tax evasion that has and
will continue to occur if left unchecked. This means that viola-
tions of the Act should be assigned felony status with the possibil-
ity of monetary fines of up to $100,000. The latter figure is one
hundred percent greater than the current maximum penalty
amount, but is proportionally smaller than the rate at which the
average excise tax has increased since 1949. The risk of $100,000
in monetary fines would be large enough to act as a deterrent to
most, if not all, remote vendors selling cigarettes in contravention
of § 376. If the penalties under § 377 were enhanced from misde-
meanors to felonies, and assuming enforcement was to remain in
the hands of the DOJ and FBI, the need to use the Jenkins Act
solely as a means to apply more severe criminal statutes would
likely cease.
Adjunctive to the enhancement of the penalty provisions is
shifting enforcement responsibilities of the Jenkins Act to an
agency with the proper resources and resolve. As demonstrated
by the DOJ and FBI, the lack of expertise and wherewithal to ful-
fill their mandate have resulted in a complete lack of enforcement.
Remote vendors operating from tribal lands proclaim their non-
compliance with the Jenkins Act with impunity452 - indeed, there is
little to fear from such antagonism when it is a near certainty that
the law will not be enforced. Given that the DOJ and FBI have
shifted their focus to the threat of domestic terrorism, the singular
enhancement of § 377 would be a wasted effort by Congress.
While shifting enforcement responsibilities to the states is cer-
tainly an option, it is not likely to be successful since many juris-
dictions would have neither the expertise nor the resources to
identify and restrain violators of § 376."' There might also be a
451. Supra note 82.
452. Supra note 354.
453. The Indiana General Assembly, for example, is considering legislation that would
impose fines on remote vendors operating in violation of the Jenkins Act or tangential state
laws. The effectiveness of such a bill has been questioned by state elected officials who
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lack of uniformity in state-by-state enforcement which would then
shift the problem from jurisdictions that are active in enjoining
violations to those that, either through indifference or a lack of
resources, are not.
The best option for ensuring enforcement of the Jenkins Act is
transferring principal responsibility to the ATF. The fact that the
ATF currently maintains ancillary authority to pursue violations
of the Jenkins Act through the CCTA,4 ' makes it the ideal agency
to assume primary enforcement authority for § 376. In concert
with the DOJ and FBI, they have also advocated to Congress the
shifting of primary enforcement authority of the Act under their
purview,"' which implies that they possess the resources to ade-
quately enforce the reporting requirements of § 376.
Should § 377 be amended to felony status with commensurate
monetary penalties, the potential increase in future prosecutions
may necessitate an increase in funding for the ATF. If, however,
remote cigarette vendors are made aware that the penalties of the
Act have been increased and that the ATF will aggressively prose-
cute violators, the deterrence effect may offset the likelihood of
future investigations and prosecutions, and thus possible in-
creased budget requirements of the ATF.
Finally, to ameliorate the inherent disconnect between identifi-
cation of violators of § 376 and the investigation and prosecution
of such persons,456 the states and the ATF will need to establish a
close rapport concerning violations of the Jenkins Act.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the earliest days of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
tenets of tribal sovereignty have evolved largely in accordance
with changing societal relationships between Indians, states, and
the federal government. The Court, the arbiter of these often
complex interrelationships, has attempted to reconcile the compet-
ing expectations and needs of the states and Indian tribes based
upon precepts articulated by Justice Marshall and his successors.
have expressed concern that the fine amounts under consideration would not be large
enough to deter remote vendors, and that the state tobacco commission would be unable to
police violations of the law due to inadequate resources. See Lesley Stedman, Indiana
Ponders Ways to Collect Taxes from Online Cigarette Sales, COURIER-J. (KY), Feb. 5, 2003,
at IA.
454. Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
455. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 21.
456. Supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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The ideas espoused by the Court during the Marshall era - indeed,
even as recent as twenty years ago - seem arcane and ill-suited to
address the current vulnerability of the several states in the area
of cigarette tax collection. However, despite the technologically
advanced milieu, the issue at present is a familiar one: What
means exist to aid the several states in enforcing tax collection
regulations against individual Indians and tribes? It took a num-
ber of years and cases for the Supreme Court to finally address the
issue that plagued those states encompassing Indian reservations;
and despite the right affirmed by the Court, the remedies (or lack
thereof) conferred were met with little elation.
The decisions leading up to Potawatomi represented refine-
ments to the principles of tribal sovereignty on the basis of a
changing economic landscape. Beginning in the 1970s, Indian re-
tailers began to capitalize on a theretofore unrealized export to
non-Indian consumers: tax exemptions. This valuable commodity,
while sustaining numerous economically-depressed tribal econo-
mies, had the adverse consequence of depriving several states of
lawfully-imposed tax revenues. By no means was the issue an
easy one to resolve. Addressed predominantly in Colville, the
Court grappled with the economic consequences to tribes by abro-
gating their ability to market tax-free cigarettes to non-Indians,
and in doing so, adapted the doctrine of tribal sovereignty to an
evolving marketplace. However, the Court ultimately reached the
proper conclusion that cigarette sales to non-Indian consumers do
not merit an exemption from state taxation, notwithstanding Jus-
tice Brennan's impassioned dissent that the Court's decision
would in fact contribute to the erosion of tribal sovereignty. While
the announcement that the Court would hear the challenge in Po-
tawatomi may have seemed to some to be nothing more than a
perfunctory affirmation of previous holdings, the upshot of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's decision is being acutely felt by the several
states to this day.
Enter the Jenkins Act. Just over a decade following Potawa-
tomi, a long-dismissed federal reporting statute reemerges to ad-
dress a threat completely unanticipated when originally enacted.
The nature of the Act nullifies concerns elucidated by past Courts:
state encroachment on the tribal right of self-government and
immunity from suit. By enabling the federal government to en-
force the rights of the states, the Jenkins Act also comports with
the long-standing principle advocated by the Court that any legis-
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lation substantially affecting Indian commerce must originate
from Congress.
The foregoing analyses demonstrate that the Jenkins Act would
likely be sustained in the event that the Act is challenged as vio-
lating tribal sovereignty or sovereign immunity but, unfortu-
nately, fail to verify the presence of one attribute crucial to the
future success of the Jenkins Act: political courage. That which
was notably absent in New York State following the Court's deci-
sion in Milhelm Attea & Bros., is a prerequisite for the enjoinment
of illicit remote vendor cigarette sales. States have demanded ac-
tion and the mechanisms are now in place; nevertheless, it re-
mains to be seen whether Congress and the executive will step up
and heed the call.

